Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the United States by Gitter, Donna M.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 4
2008
Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed
Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval




Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-
on Biologics in the United States, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2008) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol35/iss3/4





INNOVATORS AND IMITATORS: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING AN ABBREVIATED APPROVAL 


































Recommended citation: Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: An Analysis of Proposed 
Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics in the 
United States, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555 (2008).  
INNOVATORS AND IMITATORS: AN ANALYSIS OF  
PROPOSED LEGISLATION IMPLEMENTING AN  
ABBREVIATED APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR  
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ABSTRACT 
 Biopharmaceuticals, also called biologics, account for nearly one 
out of eight prescriptions written worldwide. One source estimates 
that more than $10 billion worth of biologics will come off patent by 
2016. Few generic competitors are likely to enter this market, however, 
in light of the fact that no abbreviated approval pathway presently ex-
ists for generic biologics, also called follow-on protein products. With-
out such a system in place, generic manufacturers must perform a full 
complement of lengthy and costly clinical trials in order to receive ap-
proval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to market their 
follow-on biologics. Congress is presently considering legislation, ti-
tled the Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, which would permit expe-
dited approval of certain off-patent biologics. This legislation is mod-
eled upon the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, which facilitates abbrevi-
ated approval of generic versions of traditional pharmaceuticals.  
 This Article analyzes the legal and policy implications of an abbre-
viated approval pathway for follow-on biologics, focusing on three sa-
lient aspects of this issue. First, the Article examines the effect of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act on the market for conventional drugs and con-
cludes that legislative enactment of an abbreviated approval pathway 
for follow-on protein products will have a similar salutary effect on 
the market for these biological products. Second, the Article considers 
the current state of scientific knowledge regarding biologics and de-
termines that an abbreviated approval framework for biologics is fea-
sible, at least for simpler molecules. Third, the Article analyzes the in-
tellectual property implications of an abbreviated approval pathway 
for follow-on protein products. The Article offers some recommenda-
tions for amending the Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act so as to 
maximize pioneer firms’ incentives to innovate while simultaneously 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Biopharmaceuticals, also called biological products or, simply, bio-
logics,1 now account for approximately one out of eight prescriptions 
written worldwide.2 These products, which have proven particularly 
effective in treating certain chronic conditions, such as rheumatoid 
arthritis, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and diabetes,3 are also quite ex-
pensive relative to nonbiologic pharmaceuticals, costing as much as 
twenty times more annually.4 Although one source estimates that 
more than $10 billion worth of biopharmaceutical drugs will come off 
patent by 2016,5 few generic competitors will find it worthwhile to 
enter the market upon the expiry of these patents in light of the fact 
that no abbreviated approval pathway6 presently exists for generic 
biologics.7 Without such a system in place, generic manufacturers 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Ronald A. Rader, What Is a Biopharmaceutical?, BIOEXECUTIVE INT’L, Mar. 
2005, at 60, 61, available at http://www.bioexecutiveintl.com/content/articles/frame.asp?ck 
=true&issue=0305&article=11 (noting the multifarious definitions of the term “biopharma-
ceutical” and offering the following definition: “noun: a pharmaceutical product manufac-
tured by biotechnology methods (involving live organisms; bioprocessing)”). 
 2. N. LEE RUCKER, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE,  BIOLOGICS IN PERSPECTIVE: 
EXPANDED CLINICAL OPTIONS AMID GREATER COST SCRUTINY 1 (2007), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/fs136_biologics.pdf. 
 3. Id.  
 4. Press Release, Express Scripts, Inc., Biotech Drug Spending Increases 21 Percent 
Even as Growth in Rx Expenditure Slows (Apr. 25, 2007), http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=989907&highlight=. One source 
states that annual treatment cost per patient for biologics can total tens of thousands of 
dollars per year and in some cases may exceed $100,000 annually. REP. HENRY WAXMAN, 
BACKGROUNDER ON BIOLOGICS 2, http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsbackground_2.14.07.pdf (last 
visited June 23, 2008).  
 5. ENGEL & NOVITT, LLP, POTENTIAL SAVINGS THAT MIGHT BE REALIZED BY THE 
MEDICARE PROGRAM FROM ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION SUCH AS THE ACCESS TO LIFE-
SAVING MEDICINE ACT (H.R. 6257/S. 4016) THAT ESTABLISHES A NEW CBLA PATHWAY FOR 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 12, tbl.4a, (2007) [hereinafter ENGEL & NOVITT]. 
 6. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defines an abbreviated application 
as one that relies, to at least some extent, on the Agency’s conclusions regarding the safety 
and effectiveness (or safety, purity, and potency) of an approved product and also contains 
additional data necessary, other than the underlying clinical data supporting the approved 
product, to establish that the follow-on product is safe and effective. Safe and Affordable 
Biotech Drugs—The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Over-
sight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Biotech 
Drugs] (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Commissioner, Chief Medical Officer, 
FDA), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070326104056-22106.pdf. For a 
discussion of the abbreviated approval scheme for nonbiologic generic drugs, see infra 
Part III.B. 
 7. It should be noted that the terms “generic biologic” and “biogeneric” are conten-
tious ones, as the branded pharmaceutical industry contends that generic biologics do not 
truly exist, given that biologics are so strongly affected by the manufacturing process. 
These firms prefer the term “off-patent biologic” or “follow-on biologic” (FOB). See Biotech-
nology Indus. Org. (BIO), BIO Citizen Petition to the FDA: Follow-On Therapeutic Pro-
teins 9 (Apr. 23, 2003) [hereinafter BIO Petition], available at 
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followon/BIO_CP--FINAL_DRAFT_4_22_03.pdf (describing a 
follow-on therapeutic protein as a product that does not “contain a full complement of 
original non-clinical and clinical data and that relies on any data or information contained 
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must perform a full complement of lengthy and costly clinical trials 
in order to receive approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) to market their follow-on biologics.  
 After many years of debate about this issue among numerous 
stakeholders, including the branded pharmaceutical industry, ge-
neric pharmaceutical firms, scientific researchers, government offi-
cials, employers facing rising health care costs, pharmacy benefits 
managers, and patient groups, as well as academics, Congress is 
presently considering legislation, titled the Access to Life-Saving 
Medicine Act,8 that would permit expedited FDA approval of certain 
off-patent biologics. This legislation is modeled on the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984 (HWA),9 which facilitates abbreviated approval 
of generic versions of conventional pharmaceuticals. In light of the 
unique nature and variability of each biological product, the Access 
to Life-Saving Medicine Act would allow the FDA to consider each 
biological product on a case-by-case basis. 
 This Article analyzes the legal and policy implications of imple-
menting an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics. 
Part II of this Article offers a brief primer on biologics, describing 
both their scientific characteristics as well as their significance in the 
marketplace. Part III examines the current regulatory scheme for 
FDA approval of conventional pharmaceuticals, both branded and 
generic, and for biologics as well, noting that, while the HWA fur-
nishes an abbreviated approval pathway for generic drugs, there is 
no analogous expedited approval pathway for follow-on biologics. 
Part IV explores the recent decision in Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt,10 in 
which the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
required the FDA to take action on an abbreviated application for a 
follow-on biologic product. The Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, a 
                                                                                                                     
in another product’s application” (emphasis omitted)); see also Andrew Wasson, Comment, 
Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and Off-Patent Biological Products, 
2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0004, ¶ 4 n.16 (2005), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2005dltr0004.pdf (noting that brand 
name firms prefer the term “off-patent”). The generic pharmaceutical industry, however, 
maintains that the terms “generic biologic” and “biogeneric” are indeed appropriate. See id. 
This Article uses the terms “follow-on biologic” or “follow-on protein product,” which are 
terms employed by the FDA as well. See FDA, Regulatory and Scientific Issues Related to 
Developing Follow-On Protein Products, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/follow_on/default.htm (last 
visited June 23, 2008) (“We use the informal term follow-on protein products generally to 
refer to proteins and peptides that are intended to be sufficiently similar to a product al-
ready approved under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or licensed under the 
Public Health Service Act to permit the applicant to rely on certain existing scientific 
knowledge about the safety and effectiveness of the approved protein product.”). 
 8. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007). The Senate 
companion bill is S. 623, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 10. 427 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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pending congressional bill proposing an abbreviated approval path-
way for follow-on biologics, is the subject of Part V. Part VI analyzes 
the legal and policy implications of an abbreviated approval pathway 
for follow-on biologics, focusing on three distinct aspects of this issue. 
First, drawing upon legal and economic literature, this Part exam-
ines the effect of the Hatch-Waxman Act on the market for conven-
tional drugs and concludes that legislative enactment of an abbrevi-
ated approval pathway for follow-on protein products will have a 
similar, though not identical, salutary effect on the market for these 
biological products. Second, Part VI considers whether it is feasible, 
given the current state of scientific knowledge, to approve follow-on 
biologics in the absence of a full array of clinical trials. A comprehen-
sive analysis of legal and scientific scholarship, as well as of legisla-
tive testimony, reveals that scientific knowledge presently permits 
an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics, at least for 
simpler molecules. Third, this Part also considers the intellectual 
property implications of an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-
on protein products and offers recommendations for structuring intel-
lectual property protection so as to maximize pioneer firms’ incen-
tives to innovate while simultaneously encouraging competition from 
follow-on manufacturers. Part VII examines the recently established 
approval framework for follow-on protein products in the European 
Union. Ultimately, the enactment of U.S. legislation creating an ab-
breviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics will prove essen-
tial because of the potential it offers for dramatic savings for the 
health care system. The proposed legislation properly entrusts the 
scientific aspects of the approval process to the FDA, the body that 
the U.S. public currently charges with such decisions. In terms of in-
tellectual property protection, with certain modifications, the pro-
posed bill can, with certain modifications, effectively preserve incen-
tives for innovation. 
II.   A PRIMER ON BIOLOGICS 
A.   Biologics Defined 
 A biological product, or biologic, is “a product that is derived from 
a living organism and used in the prevention, treatment, or cure” of 
human disease.11 As explained by one source, biologics “include vac-
                                                                                                                     
 11. Primer on Generic Biologics, HEALTH CARE ADVISORY (Alston & Bird, LLP, At-
lanta, Ga.), Nov. 20, 2006, at 1 [hereinafter Alston & Bird], available at 
http://www.alston.com/files/Publication/ef5353ff-48a3-4718-ad12-5b184143070d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
cdf245bf-896b-4a94-a364-06d3b18d13a7/Biogenerics%20Primer%20FDA%20Advisory.pdf;  see also 42 U.S.C. § 
262(i) (2000) (“[T]he term ‘biological product’ means a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, anti-
toxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous prod-
uct, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic 
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cines, hormones, human growth factors, enzymes, clotting and anti-
clotting factors, and recombinant protein products.”12  
 According to the FDA, “[b]iologics can be composed of sugars, pro-
teins, or nucleic acids or complex combinations of these substances, 
or may be living entities such as cells and tissues,” and “are isolated 
from a variety of natural sources—human, animal, or microorgan-
ism—and may be produced by biotechnology methods and other cut-
ting-edge technologies.”13 The FDA further notes that “[g]ene-based 
and cellular biologics . . . often are at the forefront of biomedical re-
search, and may be used to treat a variety of medical conditions for 
which no other treatments are available.”14 For example, one block-
buster biologic, Amgen’s EPOGEN®, is a genetically engineered form 
of the naturally occurring human hormone erythropoietin and is used 
to combat anemia in patients with chronic kidney disease.15  
 Biologics are distinguishable in several ways from conventional 
drugs, which are defined statutorily to include products that are “in-
tended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of disease.”16 Whereas biologics “are typically large protein 
molecules derived from living cells and manufactured through DNA 
or RNA synthesis,” drugs “are typically small molecules derived from 
chemical synthesis.”17 In addition, drugs “typically have well-defined 
structures.”18 By contrast, biologics “tend to be a mixture of hetero-
geneous proteins and impurities, each of which may contribute to the 
product’s biological activity, efficacy, and safety in ways that may be 
only partly understood, controlled and reproduced.”19 Thus, as ex-
                                                                                                                     
compound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of 
human beings.”).  
 12. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 1; FDA, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Re-
search, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fda.gov/cber/faq.htm [hereinafter FDA 
FAQs] (last visited June 23, 2008) (“Biological products include a wide range of products 
such as vaccines, blood and blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tis-
sues, and recombinant therapeutic proteins.”). 
 13. FDA FAQs, supra note 12. 
 14. Id. For a list of the top twenty biologics in 2006, see PipelineReview.com, Top 20 
Biologics 2006 (Feb. 12, 2007),  http://www.pipelinereview.com/content/view/15649/353. 
 15. Amgen, Recombinant DNA Technology, http://www.amgen.com/science/about_ 
biotechnology_recombinant_dna_technology.html (last visited June 23, 2008). In fiscal year 
2005, the biggest drug expenditure by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) on any single drug was $2 billion on EPOGEN®. WAXMAN, supra note 4, at 2. 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2000). 
 17. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 2. Proteins are generally one hundred to one 
thousand times larger than small molecules. Huub Schellekens, How Similar Do ‘Biosimi-
lars’ Need to Be?, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1357, 1357 (2004).   
 18. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 2. 
 19. Id. In particular, it is the glycosylation of some proteins, which refers to “the vari-
able attachment of small chains of sugars to the protein backbone,” that renders glycosy-
lated proteins more complex than nonglycosylated ones. David M. Dudzinski, Reflections 
on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for 
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plained by one source, “a given biologic is not generally interchange-
able with another,” and even small changes in the manufacturing 
process could result in a dramatically different final product.20 In-
deed, “a generic biologic produced by another manufacturer using a 
distinct manufacturing process could likely produce a product differ-
ent than intended.”21 Perhaps the most significant difference between 
biologics and conventional drugs, however, is immunogenicity, mean-
ing that most biologics stimulate an immune response in the body, 
prompting the formation of antibodies. Some of these antibodies may 
detrimentally impact patient health.22 
B.   The Importance of Biologics in the Marketplace 
 The FDA has approved more than 250 biological products,23 which 
are serving more than 800 million patients worldwide.24 In 2005 
alone, the FDA approved thirty-nine new biologic products and indi-
cations.25  
 Biologics generated revenue of about $32.8 billion in the United 
States in 2005.26 While these constituted approximately thirteen per-
cent of the total $251.8 billion in prescription sales to U.S. pharma-
cies in 2005,27 biologics are likely to account for an increasing market 
                                                                                                                     
Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 
60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 224 (2005). 
 20. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 2; Rob Garnick, Counterpoint: Why Biogenerics 
Are a Strawman, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 268, 269 (2006) (stating that “each bio-
pharmaceutical manufacturing process is necessarily unique” and that “small changes to 
any such process can have profound consequences on the end product”).  
 21. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 2. See supra note 7, regarding the term “generic 
biologic.” For a description of the basic steps in manufacturing a biologic, see 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS: THE SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, 
AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF ANY FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS SCHEME 6-7 (2007) [herein-
after THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS], available at 
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/WhitePaper.pdf. The hundreds of steps typically 
involved in production, which “involve numerous in-house standards,” give rise to the 
maxim that, for biopharmaceuticals, the “process is the product.” Schellekens, supra note 
17, at 1357. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impor-
tance of the production process.  
 22. See Schellekens, supra note 17, at 1358 & Box 2 (describing the problem of immu-
nogenicity); infra Part VI.B.3. (discussing immunogenicity). Only for one type of protein 
product, vaccines, does the stimulation of antibodies actually prove beneficial. Follow-On 
Biologics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th 
Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Follow-On Biologics] (statement of Jay P. Siegel, 
M.D., Johnson & Johnson), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_08/2007_03_08.html. 
 23. See Biotechnology Indus. Org., Health Care Overview, 
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/ (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 24. James Greenwood Assumes BIO Presidency as Industry Has Banner Year, 
TRACLEER & PPH NEWS, Jan. 5, 2005, http://pph-net.org/news/tracleer-news-0011.htm. 
 25. Biotechnology Indus. Org., Health Care Overview, supra note 23.  
 26. Rachel Melcer, Generic Biotech Drugs Are Proposed, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Feb. 15, 2007, at C1. 
 27. Id. 
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share in the coming years.28 Of the 2300 pharmaceutical products in 
clinical development in 2005, twenty-seven percent were biologics.29 
Because biologics are often twenty times more expensive per patient 
per day than traditional drugs30 and increasing in cost at a dramatic 
rate,31 biologics are expected to drive U.S. health care costs 
ever higher.32 
 Biologics are rendered even more costly than conventional drugs 
because they do not face robust generic competition,33 which is due to 
the absence in the United States of “a clear regulatory pathway” for 
approval of follow-on biologics.34 Generic versions of conventional 
drugs have served to lower consumers’ health care costs considera-
                                                                                                                     
 28. According to Medco Health Solutions, one of the largest pharmacy-benefits man-
agers, spending on biotech and specialty medicines grew 16.9 percent in 2005, as compared 
to the 5.4 percent average for traditional drugs. Linda Loyd, Opening a Path For Biotech 
Generics, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 2006, at E1. As noted by Rep. Jo Ann Emerson (R-
MO), the cost of biologics is of particular concern in terms of the future solvency of the 
Medicare program. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act to Give FDA Biogenerics Frame-
work, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Feb. 15, 7007. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) estimated that, in 2005, “nearly one-third of top products purchased by Medi-
care [were] biopharmaceuticals.” GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION (GPHA), 
BIOPHARMACEUTICALS (“FOLLOW-ON” PROTEIN PRODUCTS): SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR AN ABBREVIATED APPROVAL PATHWAY 4 (2004) [hereinafter GPHA SCIENTIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS], available at www.gphaonline.org/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/ 
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1670.  
 29. Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports Global Pharmaceutical Market 
Grew 7 Percent in 2005, to $602 Billion (Mar. 21, 2006), available at 
www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/article/0,2775,6025_3665_77491316,00.html.  
 30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (regarding the relative costs of biologics 
and traditional drugs); William L. Warren et al., Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biolog-
ics, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1936 (“Biologics are typically 20 
times more expensive per patient per day than a drug counterpart.”). Biologics are rela-
tively expensive when compared to small molecule drugs in large part because biologics re-
quire “exquisitely controlled manufacturing with cell culture and protein purification; BIO 
[Biotechnology Industry Organization] estimates that the cost of materials for biotechnol-
ogy manufacturing can range from twenty to 100 times that of small molecule drugs.” 
Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 179.    
 31. According to one report, the cost of biologics increased 17.5 percent in 2005, com-
pared to an increase of ten percent for traditional drugs. See The Generic Drug Maze: 
Speeding Access to Affordable, Life Saving Drugs: Hearing Before the Special S. Comm. on 
Aging, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (testimony of Mark Merritt, President and Chief Executive 
Officer, Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr161mm.pdf.  
 32. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 1 (“Biologics are likely to drive health care costs 
steadily higher.”); cf. Warren et al., supra note 30 (stating that proposed legislation in-
tended to spur the approval of follow-on biopharmaceuticals “would bring desperately 
needed competition into the biopharmaceutical marketplace and put an end to indefi-
nite monopolies”). 
 33. See supra note 7 regarding the term “generic biologic.” 
 34. PCMA: Medicare Part B Program Could Save $14 Billion in Prescription Drug 
Costs Through Biogenerics, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 4, 2007 (“Unlike conventional drug prod-
ucts where generic competition is robust, the FDA lacks a clear regulatory pathway to ap-
prove follow-on biologics, or ‘biogenerics.’ ”). 
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bly.35 Presently, many stakeholders, including the branded pharma-
ceutical industry, generic pharmaceutical firms, scientific research-
ers, government officials, employers facing rising health care costs, 
pharmacy benefits managers, and patient groups, as well as academ-
ics, are debating whether Congress should enact legislation to create 
a regulatory pathway that would enable manufacturers to market 
follow-on biologics. This issue is growing in importance as some of 
the blockbuster biologics developed at the inception of the biotech era 
in the 1980s have lost or will soon lose patent protection.36 Informed 
consideration of the implications of enacting an abbreviated approval 
pathway in order to stimulate the development of follow-on biologics 
by generic manufacturers first requires a thorough understanding of 
the separate regulatory pathways for drugs, both branded and ge-
neric, and for patented biologics.  
III.   THE REGULATORY PATHWAYS FOR DRUGS, BOTH BRANDED AND 
GENERIC, AND FOR BIOLOGICS 
 In the United States, drugs are regulated exclusively under the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA).37 Most biologics, however, are 
approved for marketing under provisions of the Public Health Service 
Act (PHSA).38 Because biologics typically meet the definition of 
“drugs” under the FDCA,39 they are governed by that statute as 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See Henry Grabowski, Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceuti-
cal and Biotechnology Industries, 8 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 7, 21 (2003) (stating that con-
gressional legislation, the HWA, “has fostered a vigorous generic industry with substantial 
benefits to consumers from price reductions”). It should be noted, however, that some 
commentators believe that, “due to the complexity of the development and testing of biolog-
ics, any generic versions would likely result in more modest savings than generic versions 
of conventional drugs.” Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 2. Others contend, however, “that 
even a price reduction of at least 20 percent could result in significant savings to consum-
ers.” Id.; cf. GPhA Hails Introduction of Legislation to Bring Affordable Generic Biophar-
maceutical Medicines to Consumers, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 29, 2006 (“Even a 5% to 10% re-
duction in biopharmaceutical costs could amount to millions in savings to consumers and 
the healthcare system.”). See infra note 215 and accompanying text regarding estimates of 
cost savings resulting from an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics. 
 36. See Kirsty Barnes, Sandoz Approval Could Open the Floodgates for Biosimilars in 
US, IN-PHARMA TECHNOLOGIST.COM, June 6, 2006, http://www.in-
pharmatechnologist.com/news/ng.asp?id=68163-sandoz-fda-biosimilar-omnitrope-follow-on-
protein (citing insulin, human growth factors, epoetin, colony stimulating factors, inter-
feron alpha, and interferon beta as among the biologics that will soon face competition 
from follow-on biologics).  
 One source estimates that more than $10 billion worth of biopharmaceutical drugs will 
come off patent by 2016. ENGEL & NOVITT, supra note 5, at 12 tbl.4a. 
 37. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000). According to the FDA, the “majority of protein products 
are licensed as biological products under the [PHSA], not approved as drugs under the 
[FDCA].” FDA, Omnitrope Questions and Answers, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/ 
somatropin/qa.htm [hereinafter Omnitrope Q&A] (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 39. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (defining drugs pursuant to the FDCA). 
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well.40 Commentators have explained that while “[t]he primary objec-
tive of the FDCA is to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the final 
product, with controlling the manufacturing process a secondary con-
cern,” for biologics, “regulation under the PHSA is focused on ‘rigid 
control of the manufacturing process,’ which reflects the particular 
scientific and historical characteristics of biopharmaceuticals.”41  
 Both the FDCA and the PHSA fall within the jurisdiction of the 
FDA.42 As a result of an October 2003 reorganization of responsibili-
ties within the FDA, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) regulates, under FDCA approval, the marketing of drugs 
and some biologics, including monoclonal antibodies for in vivo use; 
proteins intended for therapeutic use; immunomodulators; and 
growth factors, cytokines, and monoclonal antibodies intended to 
mobilize, stimulate, decrease, or otherwise alter the production of 
hematopoietic cells in vivo.43 The Center for Biologics Evaluation and 
Research (CBER) of the FDA regulates approval and marketing un-
der the PHSA of a select group of other biologics,44 including gene cel-
                                                                                                                     
 40. FDA FAQs, supra note 12 (stating that “because most biological products also 
meet the definition of ‘drugs’ under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), 
they are also subject to regulation under FD&C Act provisions.”). Moreover, the PHSA con-
tains a provision stating that nothing in that Act shall affect the FDA’s jurisdiction under 
the FDCA, thereby affirming that the FDA has the authority to regulate all biologics under 
the FDCA. 42 U.S.C. § 262(g) (2000) (“Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed 
as in any way affecting, modifying, repealing, or superseding the provisions of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”). 
 41. Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Fed-
eral Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 205-06 (1996). See su-
pra notes 16-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of the particular characteristics of 
biologics that distinguish them from drugs and highlight the importance of their manufac-
turing process. 
 42. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical reasons for the separate enact-
ment of the FDCA to regulate drugs and the PHSA to regulate biologics, see Dudzinski, 
supra note 19, at 145-79. For a more succinct description of this subject, see The Law of 
Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) 
(statement of Lester M. Crawford, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Department of 
Health & Human Servs.), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/fob0623.html (explain-
ing that “some proteins are licensed under the [PHSA] and some are approved under 
the [FDCA]”). 
 43. FDA, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Research, Transfer of Therapeutic Prod-
ucts to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/transfer/transfer.htm (last visited June 23, 2008) (explaining the 
apportionment of regulatory responsibility within the FDA for approval of drugs and bio-
logics); Dawn Willow, The Regulation of Biologic Medicine: Innovators’ Rights and Access 
to Healthcare, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 32, 35 (2006) (explaining the apportionment of 
regulatory responsibility within the FDA for approval of drugs and biologics); see also FDA, 
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, Frequently Asked Questions to CDER, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm#1 (last visited June 23, 2008) (describing 
the role of CDER generally). 
 44. Willow, supra note 43, at 35 (explaining CBER’s role in regulating biologics); 
FDA, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation and Research, About CBER, 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last visited June 23, 2008).  
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lular products, gene therapy products, vaccines, allergenic extracts 
for allergy tests, antitoxins, and blood and blood components.45 
 In order to evaluate the viability of an abbreviated approval proc-
ess for follow-on biopharmaceuticals, it is vital to consider the typical 
drug development and approval process for drugs, both branded46 
and generic, and also for branded biologic products.  
A.   The Approval Process for Branded Drugs 
 Professor Berndt, in a paper coauthored with two others, provides 
a brief overview of the approval pathway for conventional drugs.47 
This process consists of pre-clinical development, clinical develop-
ment, approval, and marketing.48  
 The pre-clinical phase of development begins with basic discovery 
and research, including in vitro and in vivo experiments in “aca-
demic, government, and industry laboratories.”49 As explained by 
Professor Berndt, “a lead or candidate compound is first identified 
and isolated after screening thousands of chemicals/proteins against 
a specific biological target,” and then, “safety/toxicity animal studies 
are conducted with this compound.”50 After carrying out extensive 
testing in various animal models, a process that generally takes one 
to five years, “the developing company, known as the sponsor, can 
file an Investigational New Drug (‘IND’) application.”51 The FDA 
must evaluate the IND and grant permission before the sponsor can 
begin clinical studies in humans.52 Approximately forty percent of 
INDs transition to the next stage of drug development, clinical test-
ing.53 
 The clinical phase of testing drugs in humans consists of three 
phases.54 Phase I clinical trials test for safety and tolerability of the 
drug in humans; involve about twenty to one hundred healthy, 
nominally paid volunteers; and generally last between one to three 
months.55 Phase II clinical trials continue testing for safety and tol-
                                                                                                                     
 45. Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, supra note 43. 
 46. The terms “brand-name drug,” “brand drug,” “innovator drug,” “ ‘pioneer’ drug,” 
and “reference drug” are synonymous. See Willow, supra note 43, at 33 & n.14. They will 
be used interchangeably in this Article.  
 47. Ernst R. Berndt et al., Opportunities for Improving the Drug Development Process: 
Results from a Survey of Industry and the FDA (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11425, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=745818. 
 48. See id. at 7-10. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 7-8.  
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. 
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erability and also assess the preliminary efficacy of the drug.56 Phase 
II trials often involve several hundred unpaid volunteers diagnosed 
with a particular condition and generally last about six months to 
two years.57 Phase III clinical trials constitute “the most costly stage 
of drug development.”58 “[D]esigned to evaluate statistically the 
safety and efficacy of the drug . . . within a larger and typically more 
diverse population,” these trials involve hundreds to several thou-
sand patients and last an average of four years.59 Approximately 
sixty-four percent of the drugs that advance to Phase III trials are 
promising enough to be submitted as New Drug Applications (NDAs) 
and new Biologic License Applications (BLAs) to the FDA.60 
 An NDA includes, inter alia, the following information: (1) reports 
of investigations demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the drug; 
(2) a list of the components of the drug; (3) a statement of the drug’s 
composition; (4) a description of the methods and facilities used for 
the “manufacture, processing, and packing” of the drug; (5) samples 
of the drug as required; and (6) samples of the labeling.61 Currently, 
the FDA takes, on average, one year to evaluate the NDA or BLA.62 
Approximately ninety percent of the “NDAs/BLAs eventually receive 
FDA approval and are marketed.”63 Once it approves a new product, 
the FDA publishes the drug name and related patent information in 
its Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evalua-
tions, also known as the Orange Book.64  
 Phase IV clinical trials, also called post-marketing studies, are 
sometimes performed, either “as a condition required by the FDA for 
initial market approval,” “to obtain approval for a new indication,” or 
for “marketing purposes.”65 Phase IV studies often observe the long-
term effects of a drug in a larger population and involve thousands of 
patients over a period of many years.66 
 Ultimately, for small molecule drugs, slightly less than twenty-
one percent of the products that enter clinical trials receive market-
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 8.  
 57. Id. at 8-9. 
 58. Id. at 9.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D) (2000). 
 62. Berndt et al., supra note 47, at 9.   
 63. Id.  
 64. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2000) (defining a “listed drug” as one that has received 
FDA approval and been listed in the FDA’s “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations”). A searchable electronic version of the Orange Book is available 
online at FDA, Electronic Orange Book, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/ (last visited June 23, 
2008).  
 65. Berndt et al., supra note 47, at 9.  
 66. Id. at 9-10.  
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ing approval;67 the comparable figure for biologics is less than one-
third.68 While the development of biologics involves a higher likeli-
hood of clinical success, the mean clinical development times are 
longer for biologics.69 In terms of research and development costs, 
biologics and traditional drugs are comparable.70 Recent estimates 
suggest that the average cost of bringing a new small molecule medi-
cine to market is between $800 million and $1.7 billion.71 For a new 
biologic, the figure is $1.2 billion.72 Small molecule drugs differ sig-
nificantly from biologics, however, in that patent-protected small 
molecule drugs typically have a limited period of market exclusivity 
before facing generic competition, whereas biologics can potentially 
enjoy monopoly status indefinitely.73 In the realm of traditional 
drugs, however, generic competition thrives due to the enactment of 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act (HWA),74 
which amended the FDCA.75 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Id. at 8-9. This figure was achieved by multiplying the various probabilities that a 
drug will proceed through the three phases of clinical trials to NDA status and then on to 
final FDA approval. 
 68. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 4; see also Henry Grabowski 
et al., The Market for Follow-On Biologics: How Will It Evolve?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1291, 
1293 (2006) (citing a recent study finding that “biologics realized higher probabilities of 
clinical success” and stating that thirty percent of biologics achieve clinical success com-
pared with 21.5 percent of new drugs). 
 69. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1293 (stating that the mean clinical develop-
ment time is ninety-eight months for biologics as compared to ninety months for tradi-
tional drugs). 
 70. Id. 
 71. PRADEEP SURESH ET AL., IMPACT OF IMPROVING PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURING 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.purdue.edu/dp/ptec/aicheV5.pdf. This cost estimate is for new chemical entities, 
however. According to a May 2002 study by the National Institute for Health Care Man-
agement Foundation, “two-thirds of the prescription drugs approved by the FDA between 
1989 and 2000 were modified versions of existing medicines or identical to drugs already 
on the market” and, therefore, were less costly to bring to market. Russell Mokhiber & 
Robert Weissman, Stripping Away Big Pharma’s Figleaf, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, June 13, 
2002, http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0613-07.htm; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, RX 
R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE DRUG INDUSTRY’S R&D “SCARE CARD” 7 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.citizen.org/documents/acfdc.pdf (contending that the cost of developing 
a new drug is $114 to $150 million).  
 72. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 4 (citation omitted).  
 73. See Press Release, U.S. Congress, Waxman, Schumer, and Clinton Unveil Bill to 
Create Clear Pathway for Generic Biologic Drugs (Feb. 14, 2007) [hereinafter “Access to 
Life-Saving Medicine Act” Press Release], available at 
http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicspressrelease_2.14.07.pdf (“Currently there is 
no statutory pathway for generic versions of biotech drugs to enter the market, even after 
all patents have expired. As a result, the manufacturers of biotech drugs can charge mo-
nopoly prices, indefinitely.”). 
 74. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 75. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000). 
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B.   The Approval Pathway for Generic Drugs Pursuant to the  
Hatch-Waxman Act 
 Prior to the enactment of the HWA in 1984, a generic manufac-
turer had to conduct the same clinical trials as the firm that was 
awarded marketing approval for the innovator drug, which greatly 
delayed the launch of more affordable generic drugs.76 The HWA af-
fords drug manufacturers two expedited approval pathways that al-
low certain drugs to avoid the full NDA process.77  
 The first “shortcut” offered by the HWA, known as an abbreviated 
new drug application (ANDA) or 505(j) application,78 is the “ ‘classic’ 
application[] for generic drugs that are identical or almost identical 
to the pioneer . . . drug.”79 This approval pathway is meant for drugs 
that are the “same,” meaning “identical in active ingredient(s), dos-
age form, strength, route of administration, and conditions of use,” to 
drugs that have already been approved.80 As noted by one commenta-
                                                                                                                     
 76. See George Fox, Note, Integra v. Merck: Limiting the Scope of the § 271(e)(1) Ex-
ception to Patent Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 195 n.16 (2004) (“Prior to the 
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug manufacturers seeking approval for a 
generic drug . . . were required to satisfy the requirements as a new drug applicant. Thus, 
the cost of approval was a major barrier to the entry of generic drugs into the market.”); 
Stephanie E. Piatt, Note, Regaining the Balance of Hatch-Waxman in the FDA Generic Ap-
proval Process: An Equitable Remedy to the Thirty-Month Stay, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 163, 165 (2003) (“Prior to 1984, generic drug companies had to conduct these same new 
drug clinical trials [as the sponsor], and thus the time to generic availability was . . . pro-
tracted.”). 
 77. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000) (allowing any person to file an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA)); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 
505(b)(2), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2000) 
(allowing a sponsor to rely on the FDA’s prior approval of the drug); see also Dudzinski, 
supra note 19, at 198 (“Hatch-Waxman implemented the ANDA and section 505(b)(2) as 
complementary routes to approval of a generic drug.”). It should be noted that both of these 
pathways are applicable only when the operative patent and non-patent marketing exclu-
sivity provisions for the innovator drug have expired. See FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation 
and Research, Omnitrope (somatropin [rDNA origin]) Questions and Answers (May 30, 
2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/somatropin/qa.htm (“A 505(b)(2) application, 
like an application under 505(j) for approval of a generic drug, can only be approved when 
the applicable patent and marketing exclusivity protections for the innovator drug have 
expired.”). See infra notes 107 & 113 and accompanying text for an explanation of non-
patent “marketing exclusivity.”  
 78. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). 
 79. See Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and Euro-
pean Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 479 n.3 (2004). 
 80. 21 C.F.R. § 314.92(a) (2007). See supra note 64 regarding the use of the term 
“listed drug” to refer to a drug already approved by the FDA. The HWA provides that an 
ANDA must state, inter alia, the following information: that the conditions of use proposed 
in the new drug’s labeling have already been accepted by the FDA for the listed drug; that 
the active ingredient(s) is (are) the same as the listed drug; that the dosage, route of ad-
ministration, and strength are the same; that bioequivalence exists between the new and 
listed drug; and the labeling is the same except for changes due to different manufacturing 
companies. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v) (2000). Under the HWA, bioequivalence is defined 
as a situation where “the rate and extent of absorption of the [generic] drug do not show a 
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tor, “[t]o expedite FDA review and approval, ANDAs require sub-
stantially less clinical and scientific information than NDAs” and 
“need not include any data relating to safety and effectiveness test-
ing.”81 Instead, manufacturers seeking FDA approval via the ANDA 
pathway can rely in full or in part on the FDA’s finding of safety and 
effectiveness for an already approved drug. The FDA makes such a 
finding based on data prepared by a third party, usually the sponsor 
of the pioneer drug who submitted the original NDA and performed 
the necessary clinical studies,82 and also based on published scientific 
literature.83 There is no need for further safety and efficacy testing 
for a true copy of a drug that the FDA has already approved.84 “This 
reliance on the innovator’s safety and effectiveness data allows ge-
neric applicants to save” considerable amounts of time and money.85 
Most drugs approved under section 505(j) are considered therapeuti-
cally equivalent to the reference drug.86 As explained by one FDA of-
ficial, “[i]n many jurisdictions, therapeutically equivalent drugs may 
be substituted at the pharmacy level, without a physician’s interven-
tion.”87 
 The second expedited drug approval pathway offered by the HWA, 
named the 505(b)(2) pathway for the section of the FDCA in which it 
                                                                                                                     
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(8)(B)(i) (2000). 
 81. James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and 
Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 261, 269 (2005); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000) (“The Secretary may not re-
quire that an abbreviated application contain information in addition to [the statutory re-
quirements].”).  
 82. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000); Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in Making Ex-
clusivity Determinations, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 196 (1999) (stating that ANDAs “rely 
on the [FDA’s] previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the referenced innovator 
drug product.”); Junod, supra note 79, at 479 n.3 (“Both 505(j) generic ANDAs and 
505(b)(2) NDAs imply reliance (in full or in part) on the data prepared by a third party, 
usually the sponsor of the reference (pioneer) drug.”).  
 83. Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 168-69 (explaining that the FDA will “accept pub-
lished scientific or medical reports (in addition to any unpublished studies conducted by 
the generic manufacturer) instead of raw data as the main documentation to support evi-
dence of safety and effectiveness of the proposed generic drug”). 
 84. FDA Citizen Petition 2001P-0323/CP1, submitted by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 
LLP, on behalf of Pfizer Inc. and Pharmacia Corp. 7 (July 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Aug01/081001/cp00001_01.pdf.  
 85. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT 
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 5 (2002) [hereinafter FTC STUDY], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (“This reliance on the innovator’s 
safety and efficacy data allows generic applicants to save very substantial amounts of 
money in development costs.”).  
 86. See Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 6, at 6 (testimony of Dr. Janet Wood-
cock). Therapeutically equivalent drugs are “approved drug products, often made by differ-
ent manufacturers” that “can be expected to have the same clinical effect and safety profile 
when administered to patients under the conditions specified in the labeling.” Id. at 4. 
 87. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 6, at 6 (testimony of Dr. Janet Woodcock). 
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appears,88 also permits a sponsor to rely on the FDA’s prior approval 
of a drug, which the FDA bases on a third party’s clinical data re-
garding safety and efficacy,89 and on published scientific literature.90 
Once again, reliance on the innovator’s data permits a generic manu-
facturer to save a great deal of time and money.91 A 505(b)(2) NDA92 
differs from an ANDA, however, in that, while the latter is used for 
identical drugs,93 a 505(b)(2) application is used for drugs that are 
only similar, not identical, to another drug.94 For example, the new 
drug may have the same composition but a different proposed use 
than the branded drug,95 or “may have a different dosage or rate of 
absorption.”96 “Instead of requiring full pre-clinical and clinical test-
ing, an applicant must submit testing only as to the differences,” and 
otherwise may rely on “published scientific literature” and “the 
FDA’s prior finding that the similar branded drug is safe and effec-
tive.”97 An approved 505(b)(2) drug may be treated as interchange-
                                                                                                                     
 88. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act § 505(b)(2), ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1052 
(1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2000)).  
 89. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2000) (referring to an applicant’s reliance on clinical 
investigations that were “not conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant 
has not obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investiga-
tions were conducted”); 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2007) (defining a 505(b)(2) application as one 
“for which the investigations described in section 505(b)(1)(A) of the act and relied upon by 
the applicant for approval of the application were not conducted by or for the applicant and 
for which the applicant has not obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or 
for whom the investigations were conducted”); Junod, supra note 79, at 479 n.3 (“Both 
505(j) generic ANDAs and 505(b)(2) NDAs imply reliance (in full or in part) on the data 
prepared by a third party, usually the sponsor of the reference (pioneer) drug. 505(b)(2) ap-
plications can rely on data originating from more than one pioneer application.”).  
 90. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 92. A 505(b)(2) application is one type of NDA. Dickinson, supra note 82, at 195-96 
(describing the two types of NDAs, a 505(b)(1) application and a 505(b)(2)). 
 93. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
 94. See Letter from Steven K. Galson, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
FDA, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Kathleen M. Sanzo, Stephan E. Lawton, 
and Stephen G. Juelsgaard 13 (May 30, 2006) [hereinafter FDA Response to Citizen Peti-
tions], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04P0231/04P-0231-pdn0001.pdf (stating that “a 
505(b)(2) application can be used for approval of those changes [from a listed drug relied 
upon] that are not so significant that they require a stand alone NDA, but that are signifi-
cant enough that they may require additional safety or effectiveness data (and, therefore, 
are not eligible for approval under section 505(j)” (citation omitted)).  
 95. Junod, supra note 79, at 479 n.3 (stating that “505(b)(2) NDAs are used for drugs 
that are only somewhat similar to another drug (e.g., the same composition but a new indi-
cation)”); see also Dickinson, supra note 82, at 196 (stating that a 505(b)(2) applicant 
“submits data to support . . . a new indication”). For examples of the types of changes to 
approved drugs that could be submitted as 505(b)(2) applications, see FDA, GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION 505(B)(2) 4-6 (1999) [hereinafter FDA 
DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/Guidance/2853dft.pdf. 
 96. Warren et al., supra note 30.  
 97. Id.; see also Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 216 (stating that section 505(b)(2) per-
mits the approval of “generic drugs with slightly less similarity to the pioneer drug than 
would be possible under ANDAs by allowing these generics to rely primarily on FDA find-
ings, while supplementing these findings with literature-based information and limited 
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able with a similar branded product if it receives a suitable substi-
tutability rating. If the new version is not considered interchange-
able, “doctors must write a prescription specifically for the new ver-
sion.”98  
 Any drugs approved under either the 505(j) or 505(b)(2) pathway 
are referred to as generic drugs.99 “While the capitalized cost of de-
veloping a new drug to the point of market approval is estimated at 
over $800 million,”100 it costs only about $1 to $2 million to obtain ap-
proval for a generic version of the drug,101 with most of the difference 
due to the fact that generic manufacturers need not conduct lengthy 
clinical trials.102 The FDA emphasizes that it does not, however, dis-
close the underlying data in the pioneer NDA but rather simply per-
mits the ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicant to rely on it rather than per-
forming duplicative clinical studies.103  
 In light of the ease with which generic manufacturers could free 
ride on the research and development conducted by innovator firms 
(and later generic entrants could do likewise vis-à-vis the first ge-
neric entrant), Congress also included in the HWA several additional 
provisions relating to intellectual property.104 Four provisions in par-
ticular benefit innovator firms. First, manufacturers of innovator 
drugs are entitled to apply for patent term restoration for a portion of 
the time spent obtaining regulatory approval.105 Second, the Act im-
                                                                                                                     
clinical data (something prohibited under the ANDA) that describe the dissimilarities from 
the pioneer drug”).  
 98. Warren et al., supra note 30. 
 99. FDA, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/ (last 
visited June 23, 2008) (“A generic drug is identical, or bioequivalent to a brand name drug 
in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteris-
tics and intended use. Although generic drugs are chemically identical to their branded 
counterparts, they are typically sold at substantial discounts from the branded price.”). 
 100. WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INNOVATION ISSUES 18 (2007); see also supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 101. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 100, at 18.  
 102. Id. at 19. 
 103. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, at 6 (stating that “[r]eliance on 
FDA’s finding or conclusion that an approved drug is safe and effective does not involve 
disclosure to the ANDA or 505(b)(2) applicant—or to the public—of the data in the listed 
drug’s NDA” and that “permitting appropriate reliance on what is already known about a 
drug . . . allows the pharmaceutical industry to target investment on innovative drug de-
velopment and to avoid ethical concerns associated with unnecessary duplicative human 
testing, saving time and resources in the drug development and approval process”).  
 104. See Bruce N. Kuhlik, The Assault on Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (2004) (noting that, with the enactment of the HWA, “Congress for 
the first time linked drug approvals to patents”). 
 105. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000) (codifying the patent term extensions of the HWA). Be-
cause the patent term runs from the time a patent application is filed, innovators lose 
some patent time while waiting for the FDA to complete its regulatory review of the patent 
and grant marketing approval. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 5. The 
patent term restoration part of the HWA aims to stimulate innovation by making up for 
572  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:555 
 
plemented special provisions for challenging the enforceability, valid-
ity, or infringement of approved drug patents.106 Third, innovator 
firms may in some cases enjoy non-patent marketing exclusivity, 
meaning “a period of time during which the FDA affords an approved 
drug protection from competing applications for marketing ap-
proval.”107 The marketing exclusivity provision precludes the FDA 
from approving any ANDA for a generic drug for five years from the 
date the FDA approved the corresponding innovator drug, if that in-
novator drug is a new chemical entity.108 If the reference drug is not a 
new chemical entity, then the FDA cannot approve any ANDA for a 
generic drug for three years after the approval date of the approved 
drug.109 Fourth, if a patent owner of an innovator drug brings a pat-
ent infringement action against a generic manufacturer within forty-
                                                                                                                     
some of this lost time. See id. (“Importantly, the Hatch-Waxman Act recognizes that there 
would be no generic market without the products developed by innovators, which is why 
that system created a system of strong set of economic incentives.”).  
 As explained by one commentator, the patent term restoration part of the Act is com-
prised of “very long, very complicated provisions.” Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
187, 190 (1999). A pioneer receives an extension term equal to the sum of one-half of the 
time of the investigational new drug (IND) period, commencing from the time during which 
a pioneer can begin human clinical trials, plus the full NDA review period. 35 U.S.C. § 
156(c), (g) (2000). The maximum patent extension time is five years, and the total length of 
time between FDA approval and the termination of the patent cannot exceed fourteen 
years. Id. § 156(c)(3), (g).  
 106. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN THE 
108TH CONGRESS AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 3-5 (2004). Commentators have 
noted that “[t]he core feature of this process is that a request for FDA marketing approval 
is treated as an ‘artificial’ act of patent infringement” which thereby allows for “judicial 
resolution of the validity, enforceability and infringement of patent rights.” Id. at 3.   
 107. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 100, at 14. Commentators have noted that mar-
keting exclusivity “does not depend on the existence of patent protection and the two rights 
may actually conflict.” WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND 
PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT”) 24 (2005). For more 
on marketing exclusivity, see infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 108. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2007). A new chemical 
entity “means a drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by FDA.” 21 
C.F.R. § 314.108(a). “Active moiety” is defined as “the molecule or ion . . . responsible for 
the physiological or pharmacological action of the drug substance.” Id.  
 Some commentators use the term “data exclusivity” to refer to this three- or five-year pe-
riod when the FDA cannot approve an ANDA for a generic drug. See, e.g., Safe and Afford-
able Biotech Drugs—The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 12 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Biotech 
Drugs] (statement of Henry G. Grabowski, Ph.D.), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070416132526.pdf.  
 109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2000). This situation could arise where an NDA neces-
sitates additional clinical investigation. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 107, at 34.  
For example, an applicant might seek approval for “new dosage forms for already approved 
drugs, a new use for [an existing] drug, or for over-the-counter marketing of a drug.” Id.   
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five days of receiving notice of the challenge to its patent,110 the FDA 
must suspend final approval of the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for 
thirty months from the date the patent owner received notice of the 
challenge to its patent.111 
 Under the HWA, generic firms also enjoy enhanced intellectual 
property rights intended to stimulate the development of generic 
products. The HWA provides a statutory exemption from claims of 
patent infringement based on acts reasonably related to seeking FDA 
approval, thereby enabling a generic competitor to enter the market 
immediately upon expiration of the innovator patent.112 The HWA 
also provides a 180-day period of generic exclusivity for the first ge-
neric applicant to successfully challenge the patent for any approved 
drug, measured from the time of the first commercial marketing of 
the generic drug.113 As explained by one commentator, this provision 
affords the successful generic “a brief amount of time to recoup its 
litigation costs while it shares duopoly prices with the 
Brand-name drug.”114 
                                                                                                                     
 110. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000). 
 111. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). This period could be shorter than thirty months if, before 
thirty months have passed, either (1) a final appellate decision holds that the listed drug’s 
patent is either invalid or not infringed or (2) the listed drug’s patent expires. See SCHACHT 
& THOMAS, supra note 106, at 4 (“If, prior to the expiration of 30 months, the court holds 
that the patent is invalid or would not be infringed, then the FDA will approve the ANDA 
when that decision occurs.”); see also Beth Understahl, Note, Authorized Generics: Careful 
Balance Undone, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 355, 364 (2005) (“If the 
patent holder files suit, ‘the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the 
thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice,’ unless the district 
court rules on the infringement claim within the thirty-month period or the patent ex-
pires.” (footnotes omitted)). Of course, if a “court holds that the patent is not invalid and 
would be infringed by the product proposed in the ANDA,” then “the FDA will not approve 
the ANDA until the patent expires.” SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 106, at 4.  
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This provision, “which permits generic companies to 
manufacture and test their products before patent expiration for the purpose of seeking 
FDA approval,” expressly overruled Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 
863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and is commonly referred to as the “Bolar exception” or the “safe har-
bor.” Kuhlik, supra note 104, at 97 n.19; SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 100, at 13 (refer-
ring to the “safe harbor” provision). 
 113. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2000); SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 106, at 9. This 
180-day period is another form of non-patent marketing exclusivity. See supra note 107 
and accompanying text (discussing the term “non-patent marketing exclusivity”); see also 
Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-day Exclusivity, 62 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 50 (2007) (referring to “180 days of marketing exclusivity”). Some 
commentators refer to this 180-day period as “generic exclusivity.” E.g., Ashlee B. Mehl, 
Note, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for Generic Drug Manufacturer: An 
Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 649 (2006). For a discussion of which 
events trigger the commencement of the 180-day period, see Stephanie Greene, A Prescrip-
tion for Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 349-50 (2005). 
 114. Steven W. Day, Note, Leaving Room for Innovation: Rejecting the FTC’s Stance 
Against Reverse Payments in Schering-Plough v. FTC, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 223, 229-
30 (2006).  
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C.   The Approval Framework for Branded Biologics 
 As noted above, the FDA regulates biologics under both the FDCA 
and the PHSA.115 Congress did, however, assure manufacturers of 
biologics that filing an application for a biologic license (BLA) obvi-
ates the need to file an NDA.116 
 Pursuant to PHSA, a BLA must demonstrate that: (1) the biologi-
cal product is “safe, pure, and potent;” (2) the facility in which the 
product is “manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets stan-
dards designed to assure that the biological product continues to be 
safe, pure, and potent;” and (3) the applicant “consents to inspection 
of [its] facility.”117 Once the applicant receives a BLA, it need only 
comply with a labeling requirement in order to market the biologic in 
interstate commerce.118 
 As noted by Professor Mandel, “[t]he NDA and BLA review proc-
esses now are nearly identical—in either case the applicant must es-
tablish, through clinical studies and other information, that their 
product is safe and effective.”119 During “the past decade[,] both the 
FDA and Congress have moved to harmonize the two approval proc-
esses” for biologics and conventional drugs.120 Indeed, congressional 
legislation enacted in 1997 expressly instructed the FDA to “ ‘mini-
mize differences in the review and approval of products’ under BLAs 
and NDAs,” while at the same time confirming that biologics were 
indeed “subject to the FDCA.”121 Professor Mandel explains that 
“[t]he primary differences between the two approval processes are 
that BLAs must meet additional requirements concerning manufac-
turing plant inspection and must demonstrate product stability,” 
while only NDA applicants must “submit patent information and a 
statement of the full composition of the drug.”122  
                                                                                                                     
 115. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 152 (stating that Congress enacted a statutory 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 262(g) (2000), that was intended “to confirm joint applicability of the 
PHSA and the FDCA to biologics, but also to allay concerns of the biologics producers that 
they would be required to file new drug applications in addition to biologics licenses”). 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(B); see also 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(d) (2007) (“Approval of a biolog-
ics license application or issuance of a biologics license shall constitute a determination 
that the establishment(s) and the product meet applicable requirements to ensure the con-
tinued safety, purity, and potency of such products.”). 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1). 
 119. Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended Admis-
sion that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, ¶ 38 (2006). 
 120. Id. (citing a 1996 FDA proposed rule, Well-Characterized Biotechnology Products; 
Elimination of Establishment License Application, 61 Fed. Reg. 2733-02, 2733-36 (pro-
posed Jan. 29, 1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 600 & 601), that made the BLA approval 
process more similar to the NDA process). 
 121. Id. (citing the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-115, § 123(a), (f), (g), 111 Stat. 2296, 2323-24 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
262(a) (2000)).  
 122. Id. at ¶ 39. 
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D.   The Lack of an Approval Pathway for Off-Patent Biologics 
 While the approval processes for drugs and biologics are quite 
similar, the FDCA and PHSA differ significantly in that there is no 
official regulatory pathway for approval of follow-on biologics. The 
HWA does not expressly provide for abbreviated approval of biologics 
and protein-based therapeutics,123 most likely because, at the time of 
its enactment, the potential of biotechnology was not fully realized.124 
Furthermore, according to some commentators, “[p]erhaps Congress 
also appreciated the difficulty in verifying bioequivalence in biologi-
cally derived drugs given the extant technology.”125   
 Legal analysis of the abbreviated approval pathways for generic 
drugs demonstrates clearly that the ANDA pathway is not applicable 
to follow-on biologics.126 First, it seems that the FDA’s own interpre-
tation of the HWA precludes the approval of follow-on biologics via 
the ANDA pathway.127 Second, a Senate report on the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA)128 stated that the 
FDAMA’s “requirement for harmonization between [the FDCA and 
the PHSA] does not apply in the case of generic products, however, 
since the authority for abbreviated new drug applications under sec-
tion 505(j) is not applicable to biological products.”129 Finally, it would 
prove exceedingly difficult, in scientific terms, to satisfy the require-
ment under the HWA that, for an ANDA to be applicable, the generic 
therapeutic must be the “same”130 as the pioneer drug. The legislative 
history of the HWA indicates that for the ANDA pathway to apply, 
the original drug and the generic should be chemically identical 
                                                                                                                     
 123. It is notable that the HWA amended the Patent Act in a couple of ways that do 
pertain to protein products. See infra text accompanying notes 367-69.  
 124. Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 167 (noting that, at the time of the enactment of the 
HWA, “the ultimate influence of biotechnology was not at that time fully appreciated,” and 
therefore “biologics and protein-based therapeutics seemingly would be excluded” from the 
legislation); see also David Schmickel, The Biotechnology Industry Organization’s View on 
Hatch-Waxman Reform, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 241, 241 (1999) (stating that “biologics cur-
rently are not part of the Hatch-Waxman scheme” because the modern biotechnology in-
dustry and the Biotechnology Industry Organization did not exist in 1984). 
 125. Arman H. Nadershahi & Joseph M. Reisman, Generic Biotech Products: Provi-
sions in Patent and Drug Development Law, BIOPROCESS INT’L, Oct. 2003, at 26. 
 126. Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 196-97. 
 127. See Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,951 
(Apr. 28, 1992) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 2, 5, 10, 310, 314, 320, & 433)  (“Title I amended 
section 505 of the [FDCA] by establishing a statutory ANDA procedure for duplicate and 
related versions of human drugs approved under section 505(b) of the act. These proce-
dures are inapplicable to antibiotics (which are approved under section 507 of the act) and 
biological drug products licensed under 42 U.S.C. 262.”). 
 128. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 1111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
FDAMA aimed to improve the FDA’s operations and effectuated several important changes 
in biologics regulation. Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 177. 
 129. S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 40 (1997). 
 130. See supra note 80 and accompanying text for the HWA’s concept of sameness. 
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molecules.131 One of the most important requirements in this statute 
is a showing of bioequivalence between the generic and brand name 
product.132 Demonstrating bioequivalence between biologics is par-
ticularly difficult,133 as compared to the relatively straightforward 
process for proving bioequivalence between chemically synthesized 
drugs.134 Because additional clinical studies may be necessary to 
prove bioequivalence for biologics,135 the ANDA route is inapplicable 
in light of the fact that the FDA cannot request supplementary pre-
clinical or clinical testing under an ANDA.136  
 While it appears clear that the FDA will not approve follow-on 
biologics under existing ANDA provisions, it seems that section 
505(b)(2) of the HWA offers an abbreviated approval pathway for fol-
low-on versions of certain biologics. This view is supported both by a 
draft guidance document issued in October 1999 by the FDA137 as 
well as by the FDA’s use of section 505(b)(2) to approve Omnitrope, a 
biologic product.138 In approving Omnitrope, however, the FDA em-
phasized that the 505(b)(2) pathway is applicable only to those fol-
low-on biologics that were originally approved under an NDA and 
governed by the FDCA, not for those approved under a BLA and sub-
ject to the PHSA.139 Indeed, the lack of any clear statutory approval 
pathway for most biologics led the FDA’s reluctance to address the 
Omnitrope application submitted by Sandoz Inc., a German generic 
pharmaceutical firm.140 The FDA ruled on the application only after 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 197 (stating that, pursuant to the legislative history 
of the HWA, “the ANDA only would apply to special cases wherein a generic protein thera-
peutic could be proved to be literally identical to the listed pioneer protein therapeutic”); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 21-23 (1984). 
 132. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2000). 
 133. See Lincoln Tsang & Donald Beers, Follow-On Biological Products: The Regula-
tory Minefield, GLOBAL COUNSEL LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK 105, 109 (2004/2005), avail-
able at http://www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/files/Article-Follow-on_biological_products.pdf 
(explaining that it is difficult to demonstrate “sameness” for biologics given the challenges 
of characterizing these products through chemical analysis). 
 134. Biotechnology Indus. Org., Follow on Biologics (FOBs): How Do Drugs and Biolog-
ics Differ?, http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/DrugsVBiologics.asp (last visited 
June 23, 2008) (“The bioequivalence of the generic drug is demonstrated through relatively 
simple analyses such as blood level testing, without the need for human clinical trials.”). 
 135. Tsang & Beers, supra note 133, at 110. 
 136. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000) (“The Secretary may not require that an abbre-
viated application contain information in addition to [the statutory requirements].”); see 
also supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 137. See generally FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 95. 
 138. See generally Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38. 
 139. See id. (“For products approved under section 505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, we believe there is existing authority to allow applications for follow-on protein prod-
ucts to be approved under section 505(b)(2) of the Act through a process that relies on the 
earlier approval of the innovator product. In contrast, there is no abbreviated approval 
pathway analogous to 505(b)(2) or 505(j) of the Act for protein products licensed under sec-
tion 351 of the Public Health Service Act.”). 
 140. See Sandoz, Facts & Figures, http://www.sandoz.com/site/en/about_sandoz/ 
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Sandoz brought legal action against the FDA compelling it to act.141 
The resulting judicial decision in Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt142 and the 
FDA’s response to it is discussed in Part IV. 
IV.   SANDOZ REQUIRES THE FDA TO TAKE ACTION ON A FOLLOW-ON 
BIOLOGIC APPLICATION 
 In July 2003, Sandoz submitted to the FDA an abbreviated NDA 
under 505(b)(2) for Omnitrope, a recombinant growth hormone for 
treatment of pediatric patients who suffer growth failure and adults 
with growth hormone deficiency.143 Some commentators refer to Om-
nitrope as a biogeneric because its active ingredient, somatropin, is 
the same as in Pfizer Inc.’s Genotropin, another recombinant human 
growth hormone, which has been marketed since 1998.144 Indeed, 
“Sandoz’s abbreviated NDA was based, in part, on the FDA’s previ-
ous approval of Genotropin.”145 Sandoz contended that “ ‘Omnitrope 
is indistinguishable from Genotropin and . . . [is] safe and effec-
tive.’ ”146  
 In May 2004 Pfizer urged the FDA to reject the Omnitrope 
NDA.147 In August 2004, the FDA informed Sandoz that “it had com-
pleted its review of Omnitrope but that because of the application’s 
‘nature and complexity . . . [the] FDA is deferring a decision on 
whether the data submitted in [the NDA] are adequate to support a 
conclusion that Omnitrope is safe and effective for the proposed indi-
cations.’ ”148 The FDA sought additional time in order to conduct a 
public process to consider the scientific and legal issues raised in citi-
zen petitions filed regarding Omnitrope approval.149  
 Sandoz then filed suit in September 2005, seeking equitable relief 
in light of the FDA’s alleged failure to comply with its statutory obli-
                                                                                                                     
company_overview/index.shtml (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 141. See supra Part III.  
 142. 427 F. Supp.  2d 29 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 143. Sandoz, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32. 
 144. Aaron J. Bouchie, Controversial New Biologic Approved in U.S., THE SCIENTIST, 
June 14, 2006, http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/23516/; see also supra note 12 
and accompanying text (describing recombinant protein products as biologics). The FDA, 
however, took care to call Omnitrope a “follow-on protein product” rather than a bio-
generic. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 145. Sandoz, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 32. Sandoz needed to perform only four additional 
phase III clinical trials to complement its reliance on the FDA’s approval of Pfizer’s Geno-
tropin. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, at 10 & n.26. But cf. THE 
DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 15 (describing Sandoz’s performance of 
four phase III clinical trials as the submission of “extensive original clinical data”).  
 146. Sandoz, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (citation omitted). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (citation omitted). 
 149. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38 (referring to the FDA’s consideration of citizen pe-
titions, the discussions in public meetings, and docket submissions in deciding whether to 
approve Omnitrope). 
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gation to act on Sandoz’s NDA within 180 days of its submission.150 
In April 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
granted Sandoz’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
FDA was required to proceed in its consideration of the 505(b)(2) 
NDA.151 The following month, the FDA approved Sandoz’s application 
for Omnitrope,152 while simultaneously cautioning that its approval 
did not indicate its intent to permit follow-on versions of all protein 
products approved under section 505 of the FDCA.153  
 The FDA based its approval of Omnitrope on its finding that Om-
nitrope is “sufficiently similar” to Pfizer’s Genotropin.154 Thus, the 
FDA relied on its prior finding of safety and effectiveness for Geno-
tropin, which was supported by clinical data provided by Pfizer.155 
According to the FDA, Omnitrope presented a special case because 
“human growth hormone (hGH) has several characteristics that en-
able one rhGH product to be adequately compared to another for 
purposes of approval under section 505(b)(2) of the [FDCA].”156 These 
include hGH’s relative lack of complexity; existing knowledge of its 
structure; its “long and well documented history of clinical use;”157 
and the existing information about its mechanism of drug action and 
human toxicity profile.158 Thus, the FDA was able to establish that 
Omnitrope is “highly similar” to Genotropin without relying on pro-
prietary CMC (chemistry, manufacturing, and control) data159 in 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Sandoz, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 32; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (2000) (citing the 180-
day statutory period for acting on a 505(b) application). 
 151. Sandoz, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
 152. Approval Letter from Dr. Robert J. Meyer, Director, Office of Drug Evaluation II, 
Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, to Beth Brannan, Sandoz, Inc. (May 30, 
2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2006/021426s000LTR.pdf. 
 153. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, at 52 (“The approval of Omni-
trope does not signal that the Agency has concluded that—regardless of the nature and 
complexity of the active ingredient and the indications for use—every protein product ap-
proved under section 505 of the [FDCA] is an appropriate candidate for reference by an 
applicant seeking approval of a follow-on protein product through an abbreviated path-
way.”). 
 154. Id. at 8.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38.  
 157. Id. Somatropin was first used as a treatment in 1958 and, at the time the FDA 
approved Omnitrope in 2006, it had already approved seven other recombinant human 
growth hormone products since 1985. See FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 
94, at 7; Bouchie, supra note 144. Although these recombinant human growth hormone 
products differ from one another in some respects, they are all considered somatropin and 
share certain identifying characteristics. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, 
at 15 n.35. 
 158. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38; see also Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 3 (noting 
that the FDA “emphasized that the relative lack of complexity of the hormone, the avail-
ability of current analytical technology, and available compendial standards greatly simpli-
fied agency review”).   
 159. CMC data include, among other information, “product specifications, analytical 
testing procedures, recipes, equipment, [and] purification and fermentation processes.” 
THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 25.  
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Pfizer’s Genotropin NDA because technological advances permit 
“relatively simple” proteins such as somatropin “to be adequately 
identified and characterized irrespective of the product’s manufactur-
ing process.”160 Furthermore, the FDA emphasized that “Omnitrope 
is not rated as therapeutically equivalent to (and therefore substitut-
able for) any of the other approved human growth hormone products” 
and is therefore more properly called a “follow-on protein product” as 
opposed to a generic biologic.161 Nonetheless, with its approval of 
Omnitrope, the FDA clearly asserted its authority to approve appli-
cations for follow-on protein products under section 505(b)(2) of the 
FDCA via reliance on the earlier approval of an innovator product as 
well as published scientific data, so long as that innovator protein 
product was approved under the FDCA.162 Indeed, the FDA noted 
that 505(b)(2) “expressly permits” an applicant to support its applica-
tion with clinical studies that “were not conducted by or for the ap-
plicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a right of refer-
ence or use from the person by or for whom the investigations 
were conducted.”163  
 Even while asserting its authority, the FDA seemed to downplay 
somewhat its approval of Omnitrope by pointing out that it had ap-
proved a handful of other follow-on protein products under section 
505 of the FDCA.164 Sandoz, however, emphasized that Omnitrope 
was “the first recombinant product that refer[red] in its application 
to the prior FDA approval of an existing recombinant product,” 
whereas the other FDA approvals of biologics under 505(b)(2) related 
to “ ‘previously approved naturally-sourced or synthetic products.’ ”165 
According to the FDA, however, its approval of Omnitrope pursuant 
to 505(b)(2) did not indicate that “more complex and/or less well un-
                                                                                                                     
 160. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, at 15, 46 (“Recombinant hGH 
(somatropin) products are not necessarily defined by their manufacturing processes []. 
Rather, through improved analytical techniques and other testing, we have been able to 
determine that two rhGH products, Omnitrope and Genotropin, are highly similar even 
though they may be produced through different processes.”). 
 161. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38; see also FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra 
note 94, at 2 n.7 (defining “follow-on protein products” as “protein[] and peptide[] [prod-
ucts] that are intended to be sufficiently similar to a product already approved . . . or li-
censed . . . to permit the applicant to rely on certain existing scientific knowledge about the 
safety and effectiveness of the approved protein product.”); see also supra note 7 (defining 
follow-on protein products).   
 162. See Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38 (“For products approved under section 505 of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, we believe there is existing authority to allow applica-
tions for follow-on protein products to be approved under section 505(b)(2) of the [FDCA] 
through a process that relies on the earlier approval of the innovator product.”).  
 163. FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, at 42 (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(2)).  
 164. See Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38 (listing other follow-on protein products ap-
proved under section 505 of the FDCA). 
 165. Barnes, supra note 36 (quoting Sandoz spokesperson Kurt Leidner) (empha-
sis omitted).  
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derstood proteins approved as drugs under the [FDCA]” could gain 
approval as follow-on products.166 What is more, the FDA explicitly 
stated that the 505(b)(2) approval pathway does not apply to biologic 
products originally licensed under the PHSA,167 which accounts for 
most biologics.168 In the FDA’s view, Congress would need to enact 
new legislation amending the PHSA in order for the FDA to have au-
thority to approve generic or biosimilar biologics.169 Congressional 
legislation establishing a proper regulatory pathway would provide 
the industry with clear guidelines. 
 In the absence of an approval pathway for follow-on biologics, pio-
neer biologics enjoy de facto patent exclusivity even after their patent 
protection expires, since the FDA does not have legal authority to 
approve any competing follow-on products.170 Would-be follow-on 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38. 
 Commentators have explained that the FDA’s approval of Omnitrope provides “some in-
formal guidance regarding the likelihood of approval of future generic biologic applications 
under 505(b)(2).” Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 3. According to these commentators: 
[A] generic biologic most likely will be approved under the 505(b)(2) pathway 
when: (1) it is a product that has traditionally been regulated under the FDCA 
as an NDA and not under the PHSA as a BLA; (2) it shares other key charac-
teristics with reference biologics, in particular, their proposed strengths, indi-
cations, route of administration, and conditions of use; (3) FDA’s prior finding 
of safety and effectiveness for the reference product provides some, but not nec-
essarily all or sufficient, support for the proposed generic’s approval; and (4) 
data demonstrate that the proposed product, to the extent that it differs from 
the listed product referenced in the application, is safe and effective. For exam-
ple, any impurities found in the proposed product that were not present in the 
reference product should be adequately characterized by non-clinical and clini-
cal studies and should be found not to have a negative impact on safety or effec-
tiveness. 
Id.  
 167. Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38; FDA Response to Citizen Petitions, supra note 94, 
at 2 n.7 (“We note that there is no abbreviated approval pathway analogous to 505(b)(2) or 
505(j) of the [FDCA] for protein products licensed under section 351 of the PHSA.”). The 
FDA took care to distinguish recombinant human growth hormone, which had “long been 
regulated under section 505 of the [FDCA]” from protein products that are regulated under 
the PHSA. Id. at 44 “Human growth hormone (somatropin) falls within the definition of a 
drug and hGH products have been regulated as drugs under section 505 of the Act since 
before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments” Id. Other proteins approved 
under section 505 before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments include “insu-
lin, hyaluronidase, mentropins, and glucagon” and also meet the statutory definition of 
drugs. Id. at 44 n.82. In addition, “Genotropin and other innovator rhGH products were 
submitted for approval under section [505]” of the FDCA “and have been regulated as drug 
products under the Act since 1985.” Id. at 45-46 n.89. The regulation of these protein prod-
ucts under the FDCA as opposed to the PHSA is the result of historical practice rather 
than scientific rationale. See Dudzinski, supra note 19, at 161-65. 
 168. As noted above, the majority of biologics are licensed under the PHSA. Omnitrope 
Q&A, supra note 38. 
 169. See Omnitrope Q&A, supra note 38 (stating that an abbreviated approval path-
way for “the approval or licensure of follow-on protein products under the Public Health 
Service Act would require new legislation”). 
 170.  “Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act” Press Release, supra note 73. (“Currently 
there is no statutory pathway for generic versions of biotech drugs to enter the market, 
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manufacturers cannot simply imitate the original manufacturing 
process, because pharmaceutical manufacturers, in addition to their 
patent protection, retain the right under FDA rules to maintain in-
definitely certain confidential business information within their drug 
applications, including information deemed a trade secret. Thus, for 
each follow-on version of a biologic, an applicant must currently 
submit a new BLA, which necessitates costly preclinical and clinical 
testing.171 As noted by Professor Mandel, the resultant approval proc-
ess for follow-on biologics is “much more expensive, lengthy, and un-
certain than for conventional generics, and substantially forecloses 
biologic generics from the market.”172 Seeking to rectify this problem, 
several congressional representatives introduced legislation in 2007 
that would create an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on bio-
logics. 
V.   PENDING LEGISLATION PROPOSES AN APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR 
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 
 On February 14, 2007, a bipartisan group of congressional repre-
sentatives, including Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA),173 Jo 
Ann Emerson (R-MO), and Frank Pallone (D-NJ), as well as Senators 
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), in-
troduced House Bill 1038, the Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, 174 
                                                                                                                     
even after all patents have expired. As a result, the manufacturers of biotech drugs can 
charge monopoly prices, indefinitely.”). 
 171. See Warren et al., supra note 30.  
 172. Mandel, supra note 119, at ¶ 44. 
 173. Rep. Waxman (D-CA) also sponsored, with Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly referred to as the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. See Statement of Henry A. Waxman, U.S. Congress, House of Reps., 
Introduction of the Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act (Feb. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsstatement_2.14.07.pdf. See supra Part III.B. 
for a discussion of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
 174. Rep. Henry Waxman, Issues and Legislation, Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, 
http://www.house.gov/waxman/issues/health/generic_biologics.htm (last visited June 23, 
2008). Other original cosponsors of this legislation are Representatives Rahm Emanuel (D-
IL) and Mazie Hirono (D-HI) and Senators David Vitter (R-LA), Susan M. Collins (R-ME), 
Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), and Debbie Stabenow (D-MI). Id. The text of the House bill, The 
Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007), is available at 
http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsbilltext_2.14.07.pdf. The Senate companion 
bill is S. 623, 110th Cong. (2007), and is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ (click “Bill 
Number,” then search “Bill Text” for “S 623”). 
See Update: “Comparable” Biologics Bill Reintroduced, CLIENT ADVISORY (Arnold & Porter 
LLP), Feb. 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Arnold & Porter], available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/A&PCAdvisory-Update-ComparableBiologicsBillReintroduced_0207.pdf.  
 House Bill 1038 was first introduced in September 2006, see Alston & Bird, supra note 
11, at 5, but because it had not passed by the end of the session, its sponsors reintroduced 
it the following session. Maribel Rios, Congressional Bill Establishes Biogenerics Approval 
Path, EPT: THE ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER OF PHARMACEUTICAL TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 15, 
2007,  http://www.pharmtech.com/pharmtech/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=405501. House 
Bill 1038 is similar, but not identical, to the previous version. See Arnold & Porter, supra 
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which would give the FDA express legal authority to approve abbre-
viated applications for biological products that are “comparable” to 
previously approved brand name biological products.175 In light of the 
variability of biologic products, the bill proposes a product-by-product 
process for approving biologics, granting the FDA the discretion to 
require any additional clinical studies that it deems necessary in or-
der to determine whether a new product is comparable to a brand 
name product.176  
 More specifically, House Bill 1038 proposes to amend the PHSA, 
and would therefore apply to biologics licensed under that Act.177 It 
would authorize the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the 
Secretary) to approve abbreviated applications for biological products 
that are “comparable”178 to and “interchangeable”179 with previously 
approved brand name biological products.180  
 The bill requires an abbreviated application for a comparable bio-
logical product to contain information showing that, among other 
things, the new product is comparable to the reference product; the 
two products have “highly similar principal molecular structural fea-
tures”; the two products have the same mechanism of action, to the 
extent such mechanism is known; the proposed product label carries 
one or more of the approved indications for the reference product; 
and the route of administration, dosage form, and strength of the two 
products are the same.181 House Bill 1038 allows the FDA to require 
                                                                                                                     
(explaining that the bill is similar to legislation introduced in September 2006 by some of 
the same sponsors).  
 As of June 2008, House Bill 1038 was in the first stage of the legislative process, where 
it was considered in committees that deliberate, investigate, and revise bills before they go 
to general debate. GovTrack.us, H.R. 1038, 110th Congress, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1038 (last visited June 23, 2008). The 
bill was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee and the House Judiciary 
Committee. Id. The House Energy and Commerce Committee referred the bill to the Sub-
committee on Health. Id. As noted by one bill-tracking Web site, the majority of bills never 
advance past the committee stage. Id.  
 175. See  “Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act” Press Release, supra note 73. 
 176. See The Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(1)(B) 
(2007), available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsbilltext_2.14.07.pdf (“Two 
biological products . . . may be demonstrated to contain highly similar principal molecular 
structural features based upon such data and other information characterizing the two 
products as the Secretary [of HHS] determines to be necessary.”).  
 177. Id. at Preamble (describing the bill’s purpose “[t]o amend the Public Health Ser-
vice Act to provide for the licensing of comparable and interchangeable biological prod-
ucts”).   
 178. See id. § 2(a)(4) (defining “comparability” as “the absence of clinically meaningful 
differences between the biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety, 
purity, and potency of the product.”). 
 179. See id. § 2(a)(5) (defining “interchangeability” as comparability coupled with the 
ability to “produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient”). 
 180. See id. § 3(k).  
 181. See id. § 3(k)(1). The FDA would even have discretion to approve a comparable 
biologic that does not meet these criteria so long as the application establishes the safety, 
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any necessary clinical studies in order “to confirm safety, purity, and 
potency.”182 Tracking the HWA, House Bill 1038 also seems to permit 
a manufacturer of a follow-on protein to rely upon, as part of its ap-
plication, the FDA’s approval of a brand name biologic.183  
 The Secretary is required to approve a comparable biological ap-
plication unless there is insufficient information to establish that the 
above conditions have been met; the product is in some way unsafe, 
impure, or ineffective; or the application contains an untrue state-
ment of material fact.184 A comparable biologic may even be given the 
same name as the innovator product, if the Secretary determines 
that this is “necessary or desirable in the interests of usefulness 
or simplicity.”185 
 An applicant for a comparable biological product may also choose, 
but is not required, to establish interchangeability,186 meaning that 
the “new product can be substituted for the brand name product at 
the pharmacy level.”187 The Secretary is granted discretion to deter-
                                                                                                                     
purity, and potency of the follow-on product relative to the branded product for its pro-
posed use. See id. § 3(k)(2). 
 182. Id. § 2(a)(4)(B). 
 183. See id. § 3(k)(1)(G) (providing that an abbreviated biological product application 
may include, “[a]t the applicant’s option, publicly-available information regarding the Sec-
retary’s previous determination that the reference product is safe, pure, and potent.”); su-
pra notes 82 & 84, and accompanying text (explaining that both 505(j) and 505(b)(2) appli-
cations may rely on the FDA’s approval of another drug even if the applicant has not con-
ducted the clinical studies itself and has no right of reference to the proprietary informa-
tion). As commentators have noted, it is not clear whether the language in House Bill 1038, 
permitting reliance upon “publicly-available information,” is “the same as the ‘finding’ of 
safety and effectiveness that FDA says supports approvals of 505(b)(2) applications, but 
this provision would potentially allow the agency to cite its publicly articulated findings 
with respect to the innovator biologic to greatly reduce the product-specific data required 
for approval of a ‘generic’ biologic.” Arnold & Porter, supra note 174, at 2 (citations omit-
ted). 
 184. See H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(4)(A). 
 185. Id. § 3(k)(6). 
 186. Id. § 3(k)(8) (“In an original application or a supplement to an application under 
this subsection, an applicant may submit information to the Secretary to demonstrate the 
interchangeability of a comparable biological product and the reference product. An appli-
cant may withdraw an interchangeability submission at any time.”).  
 187. REP. HENRY WAXMAN, QUICK SUMMARY, THE ACCESS TO LIFE-SAVING MEDICINE 
ACT 2, available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsquicksummary_2.14.07.pdf 
(last visited June 23, 2008). As explained in literature disseminated by Representative 
Waxman, interchangeable products would “generate the greatest cost savings,” but it is 
costly and difficult to determine if two biologics are truly interchangeable. REP. HENRY 
WAXMAN, DETAILED OUTLINE, THE ACCESS TO LIFE-SAVING MEDICINE ACT 3  [hereinafter 
DETAILED OUTLINE], available at http://www.house.gov/waxman/pdfs/biologicsbillsummary_2.14.07.pdf (last 
visited June 23, 2008). In contrast, a determination of “ ‘bioequivalence’ ” is fairly easy to 
achieve for traditional drugs. See id. Thus, House Bill 1038 provides incentives for the de-
velopment of interchangeable products, but does not mandate that each comparable prod-
uct achieve interchangeability. Id.  
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mine what studies are required to establish interchangeability.188 If a 
biologic is found interchangeable and the applicant requests, the bill 
permits the label of the new product to state that it is interchange-
able with the reference product.189 In order to stimulate the develop-
ment of interchangeable products, the bill grants the first applicant 
to obtain approval of an interchangeable product a 180-day period of 
market exclusivity during which time no other interchangeable ver-
sion of the product may be approved.190 In addition, the bill prohibits 
the reference drug company from rebranding authorized generics191 
for sale during the 180-day exclusivity period.192 House Bill 1038 
seeks in this way to heighten the incentive for a generic firm to un-
dertake a patent challenge and also to increase the likelihood that 
the generic firm will be able to recoup the costs of doing so.193 
 House Bill 1038 also provides a process for early resolution of pat-
ent disputes which could otherwise delay competition.194 If an appli-
cant of a comparable biologic elects to ask the patent holder of the 
reference product for a list of all patents related to the product, the 
patent holder must disclose this information within sixty days.195 
There are also provisions for keeping this list updated.196 A patent 
                                                                                                                     
 188. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(8)(B) (charging the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, within one year after the legislation’s enactment, with issuing “guid-
ance regarding standards and requirements for interchangeability”). 
 189. Id. § 3(k)(9). Interchangeability may be demonstrated “for one or more specified 
conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling of the biological 
product.” Arnold & Porter, supra note 174, at 1. Commentators have noted that, where the 
innovator product had multiple conditions of use, this language would offer the follow-on 
manufacturer great “flexibility in achieving an interchangeability” designation. Id.  
 190. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(10)(A). This provision mirrors a similar one in the HWA. See su-
pra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 191. Authorized generics are the brand firm’s own reference products that are repack-
aged and marketed either through the brand’s subsidiary or a third-party generic distribu-
tor. GPhA Calls PhRMA’s Authorized Generics Study ‘Disingenuous’, LAB BUSINESS WEEK, 
May 6, 2007, at 799 [hereinafter LAB BUSINESS WEEK]; Generic Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion; Recent Activities Involving Generic Pharmaceutical Association Announced, AGING & 
ELDER HEALTH WEEK, Jan. 14, 2007, at 429 [hereinafter AGING & ELDER HEALTH WEEK]. 
 192. See H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(10)(B).  
 193. See LAB BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 191 (noting that the purpose of the 180-day 
generic exclusivity period is “to permit the generic company alone to compete with the 
brand company, allowing the generic to recoup costs incurred for undertaking a patent 
challenge”). Under the HWA, the FDA treats authorized generics as branded products for 
the purposes of product approval and therefore allows them to compete with generic prod-
ucts awarded 180-day exclusivity. AGING & ELDER HEALTH WEEK, supra note 191. See su-
pra notes 113-14 and accompanying text regarding the generic exclusivity provision under 
the HWA. See infra Part VI.C.4. for a policy discussion of the generic exclusivity period 
pursuant to House Bill 1038.  
 194. The HWA has been criticized for failing to ensure early resolution of patent dis-
putes. See DETAILED OUTLINE, supra note 187, at 3.   
 195. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong.  § 3(k)(17)(A)(i).  
 196. Id. §§ 3(k)(17)(A)(iii) (2007); see also 3(b) (Additional Amendments). This provision 
was included in order to provide follow-on manufacturers of biologics with information 
about patents held by innovator firms analogous to the information available to manufac-
turers of generic drugs. Generic drug manufacturers can access such patent information in 
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holder must also commence a patent infringement suit within forty-
five days of notice of a challenge or else forfeit the opportunity to 
seek any remedy other than a reasonable royalty.197  
 Several organizations have expressed their support of House Bill 
1038, including the Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA)198 
and its members, as well as numerous insurance companies; patient 
and consumer groups; and unions.199 Among those opposed to the bill 
are the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO)200 and its mem-
bers.201 Part VI will analyze the arguments for and against follow-on 
biologics in general, as well as this legislation in particular. 
VI.   POLICY ANALYSIS OF FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS AND  
HOUSE BILL 1038 
 The creation of an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on bio-
logics involves consideration of several policy issues.202 First, because 
                                                                                                                     
the Orange Book, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, but manufacturers of biologics 
do not publish their patent information in the Orange Book. See Tam Q. Dinh, Potential 
Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics under Existing Law and Proposed 
Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77, 111 (2007) (stating that “a biologic approved 
under a BLA is not listed in the Orange Book”).  
 197. H.R. 1038, §§ 3(k)(17)(C), 3(b) (Additional Amendments). Similarly, the HWA pro-
vides that an innovator firm has forty-five days in which to bring an action for patent in-
fringement against a follow-on manufacturer. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000).  
 198. “The Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) represents the manufacturers 
and distributors of finished generic pharmaceutical products, manufacturers and distribu-
tors of bulk active pharmaceutical chemicals, and suppliers of other goods and services to 
the generic pharmaceutical industry.” Generic Pharmaceutical Association, About Us, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=about_us (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 199. See Rep. Henry Waxman, Issues and Legislation, Access to Life-Saving Medicine 
Act, Letters of Support, http://www.house.gov/waxman/issues/health/generic_biologics_letters_support.htm (last 
visited June 23, 2008) (providing links to letters of support). 
 200. BIO is a nonprofit trade group that describes itself as representing “more than 
1,000 biotechnology companies, academic institutions, biotechnology centers and related 
organizations in all 50 U.S. states and 33 other nations.” Biotechnology Indus. Org., Join 
BIO, http://bio.org/join/ (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 201. BIO Restates Opposition to H.R. 1038, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.genengnews.com/news/bnitem.aspx?name=14818497. 
Some commentators maintain that House Bill 1038 strongly favors the generic industry 
and awaits further negotiation with the branded industry. Arnold & Porter, supra note 
174, at 2 (stating that the legislation, “despite bi-partisan sponsorship, is unlikely to be 
enacted as written” and instead “appears to be the opening negotiating position of the ge-
neric industry”); Xenia P. Kobylarz, The Patent Killer, IP LAW & BUSINESS, May 2007, (cit-
ing legal counsel to several biotech companies as stating that House Bill 1038 is biased 
against innovators and is in an early stage of drafting). 
 202. The constitutional takings issue surrounding the FDA’s reliance upon an innova-
tor’s safety and effectiveness data is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article assumes, 
for the sake of the analysis herein, that the FDA is permitted, under the U.S. Constitution, 
to rely indirectly on proprietary data submitted by a manufacturer of a branded drug when 
the FDA considers a follow-on drug. Several authors have examined this constitutional is-
sue. See John C. Yoo, Takings Issues in the Approval of Generic Biologics, 60 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 33, 39-42 (2005) (concluding that FDA reliance on its approval of earlier biologics to 
approve follow-on biologics would not present a takings problem because the FDA need not 
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the HWA created an abbreviated approval pathway for generic 
drugs, it is important to evaluate whether the HWA has had a salu-
tary effect on the market for traditional drugs, paying close attention 
to any differences that might arise in the case of biologics. Second, 
one must assess whether the FDA has the scientific capability to as-
sess follow-on protein products for safety and efficacy in the absence 
of a full complement of clinical trials for these products. Third, one 
must consider how best to preserve incentives for innovation by 
branded firms. Analysis of these issues will help to determine 
whether an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics, 
and whether House Bill 1038 in particular, is likely to encourage the 
development of a robust market for safe and effective follow-on bio-
logics, and simultaneously preserve incentives for innovation by 
branded firms. 
A.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Modeled on the HWA Ultimately Will Stimulate the Development of 
More Affordable Biologics 
 Government agencies, academics, and industry participants gen-
erally consider the HWA a success overall, both in terms of stimulat-
ing generic competition and in providing incentives for innovation.203 
                                                                                                                     
rely on the pioneer manufacturer’s underlying data, but rather simply on the public fact 
that the FDA had already approved the innovator drug based on the drug’s satisfaction of 
the safety and efficacy requirements, just as is done under the HWA for conventional 
drugs); Wasson, supra note 7, at ¶ 30 (stating that “it is unlikely that the approval of off-
patent biologics originally approved under the FDCA would be a taking” because “brand 
name manufacturers had notice, under the Hatch-Waxman amendments, that the FDA 
would consider follow-on products in light of previous safety and effectiveness findings”). 
 203. See CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW 
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 50 (1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf (stating that “many purchasers are bet-
ter off since the act, as most top-selling off-patent brand-name drugs now have generic ver-
sions available” and “[o]verall, it appears that the incentives for drug companies to inno-
vate have remained intact since the Hatch-Waxman Act; even as sales revenues from in-
novator drugs have more than tripled, the percentage of those revenues that manufactur-
ers reinvest in R&D has risen from 14.7 percent to 19.4 percent between 1983 and 1995”); 
Presentation, Gary J. Buehler, Director, Center for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, 
The FDA Process for Approving Generic Drugs 4 (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/02-10_BCBS_gjb/sld001.htm (stating that the HWA is 
“[c]onsidered one of the most successful pieces of legislation ever passed.”); Grabowski, su-
pra note 35, at 21 (“Overall, Hatch-Waxman has provided a relatively balanced approach 
to the trade-offs between pharmaceutical R&D and generic competition. Improvements on 
the margin could be considered by policy makers . . . . Nevertheless, the law has provided a 
reasonably well structured system of incentives for both innovative and generic firms. Both 
R&D investments and generic utilization have increased dramatically in the period since 
the passage, consistent with the objectives of the act.”); Hatch-Waxman Reform Shifts Into 
High Gear in Debate, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, June 26, 2002, (quoting the Executive 
Vice President of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), 
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Since the enactment of the HWA, generic drugs are indeed widely 
available.204 According to the GPhA, relying on data from other 
sources, four of the top five U.S. pharmaceutical companies, based on 
the number of prescriptions dispensed, are generic companies—
Novartis (Sandoz), Teva, Mylan, and Watson.205 In addition, 8730 of 
the 11,487 drugs listed in the FDA’s Orange Book have generic coun-
terparts.206 Generic drugs are also considerably cheaper than their 
branded counterparts.207 According to the GPhA, generics repre-
sented sixty-five percent of the total prescriptions dispensed in the 
United States, but only 20.5 percent of all dollars spent on prescrip-
tion drugs.208 In that same year, the average retail price of a generic 
prescription drug was $32.23, while the average retail price of a 
brand name prescription drug was $111.02.209 At the same time, the 
pharmaceutical industry has enjoyed significant profits and was re-
cently ranked the second most profitable industry in the United 
States in terms of return on revenue.210 
 Based on the success of the HWA, it would seem that an abbrevi-
ated approval pathway for biologics would likewise stimulate the de-
velopment of follow-on products and that incentives for innovation 
would not weaken. One study of the market potential of follow-on 
biologics, coauthored by Professor Grabowski, predicted that “limited 
competition of either the nonbranded or the branded variety is most 
likely in the short run because of regulatory conservatism, relatively 
high barriers to entry, and initial caution on follow-on product accep-
tance.”211 According to this study, “for the typical drug, generic prices 
begin to approach their long-run marginal cost when there are at 
least ten competitors in the market.”212 For commercially successful 
drug products, this occurs quickly, typically less than a year after 
                                                                                                                     
which represents the branded pharmaceutical industry, as describing the HWA as “a bal-
anced success for patients, generics and innovators”).  
 204. FTC STUDY, supra note 85, at i (stating that “Hatch-Waxman has increased ge-
neric drug entry” and noting that prior to the enactment of the HWA, nineteen percent of 
prescriptions were for generics, compared to more than forty-seven percent in 2000); 
Grabowski, supra note 35, at 21 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act has fostered a vigorous generic 
industry with substantial benefits to consumers from price reductions.”); Mossinghoff, su-
pra note 105, at 194 (“The robust generic drug industry owes its very existence to the 
Act . . . .”). 
 205. Generic Pharmaceutical Association, About Generics, Statistics, 
http://www.gphaonline.org/Content/NavigationMenu/AboutGenerics/Statistics/default.htm 
(last visited June 23, 2008). 
 206. Id.  
 207. See id.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. CNNMoney.com, FORTUNE 500, Most Profitable Industries: Return on Revenue 
(Apr. 30, 2007), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/performers/industries/return_on_revenues/ 
index.html.  
 211. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1296. 
 212. Id.  
588  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:555 
 
patent expiration, and, more recently, even within a few months.213 
For follow-on biologics, the authors expect that more time will be 
needed in order to drive prices down to their marginal cost because 
in the short run fewer competitors will enter and average prices will 
drop less than was the case after the enactment of the HWA.214 Thus, 
Professor Grabowski and his coauthors urge those who attempt to 
calculate the budgetary savings from follow-on biologics to make con-
servative assumptions.215 Nevertheless, Professor Grabowski and his 
coauthors conclude that, over time, a “robust follow-on market is 
likely to emerge as regulatory standards evolve and demand devel-
ops.”216 
                                                                                                                     
 213. Id.   
 214. Id. at 1291, 1296; see also John Ansell, Biogenerics Part I: Set to Make Real In-
roads or Not?, PHARMA WEEK, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.pharmaweek.com/Exclusive_Content/1_26.asp 
(stating that “it will still take several more years than expected, in many cases, for compe-
tition with original biotech products to emerge” and that “[t]his potential lag in competition 
is an important factor that should be taken into account when forecasting biotech prod-
uct sales”). 
 215. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1299; see also Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra 
note 108, at 7 (testimony of Dr. Henry G. Grabowski) (projecting, for markets with one to 
three entrants, that follow-on biologics would cost ten to twenty-five percent less than 
branded versions, which accords with results achieved in Europe); Access to Life-Saving 
Medicine Act to Give FDA Biogenerics Framework, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Feb. 15, 7007 
(citing a 2007 study sponsored by the Pharmaceutical Care Management Association 
(PCMA) estimating that follow-on biologics would cost ten to twenty-five percent less than 
the branded versions).  
 According to this 2007 study by the PCMA, the national association representing phar-
macy benefits managers, see PCMA, About PCMA, http://pcmanet.org/about/ (last visited 
June 23, 2008), the estimated cost savings to Medicare Part B, if the FDA were to develop 
a framework for evaluation and approval of follow-on protein products, is roughly $14.9 bil-
lion for the period from 2007-2016. Engel & Novitt, supra note 5, at 2. Another study pub-
lished in 2007 by Express Scripts, one of the nation’s leading pharmacy benefit manage-
ment companies, see Express Scripts, Investor Information, Corporate Profile, 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=69641&p=irol-homeprofile (last visited June 
23, 2008), estimated that an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on protein products 
could potentially save the U.S. healthcare system $71 billion over a ten-year period. STEVE 
MILLER & JONAH HOUTS, EXPRESS SCRIPTS, POTENTIAL SAVINGS OF BIOGENERICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (2007), available at http://www.express-scripts.com/ourcompany/news/outcomesresearch/ 
onlinepublications/study/potentialSavingsBiogenericsUS.pdf. 
 For its part, BIO, see supra note 200 and accompanying text, has disputed the conclu-
sions set forth in these two studies and maintains that they significantly overestimate the 
potential savings from follow-on biologics. Ted Buckley, Recent Studies of Follow-On Bio-
logics Are Based on Seriously Flawed Assumptions, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., Feb. 22, 
2007, http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followon/20070222.pdf. BIO contends that these two 
studies are based on several flawed premises, including erroneously high estimations of 
market penetration rates for follow-on products and inaccurate predictions as to the likeli-
hood that all biologics will have follow-ons in the near future. See id. ¶¶ 4 & 7. As noted by 
Professor Grabowski and his coauthors, purchasers of biologics might not readily accept 
follow-on products. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1298; see also infra notes 227-30 and 
accompanying text. What is more, given the complexity of biologics, it is certainly possible 
that it will not be scientifically feasible to create a follow-on version of each one. See infra 
Part VI.B.  regarding the scientific challenges surrounding follow-on biologics. 
 216. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1299. 
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 In their study, Professor Grabowski and his coauthors cite three 
reasons why they believe that the market for follow-on biologics will 
develop more slowly than the market for generic drugs.217 First, they 
point out that there is no clear regulatory pathway for follow-on bio-
logics.218 Given the variability and complexity of biologics, it is likely 
that any abbreviated pathway would require follow-on manufactur-
ers to conduct at least some clinical testing.219 Naturally, enactment 
of House Bill 1038 would greatly decrease this barrier to mar-
ket competition.  
 Second, Professor Grabowski and his coauthors believe that the 
market for follow-on biologics will develop slowly as compared to the 
market for generic drugs due to technology and manufacturing barri-
ers to entry and barriers that impede the decline of manufacturing 
costs over time.220 They posit that a recent wave of biologics approv-
als and investments in biologic manufacturing suggests that firms 
will not be easily able to increase their production in the near fu-
ture.221 As noted by Professor Grabowski and his coauthors, only the 
largest or most firmly established generic manufacturers would be 
able to face the major financial hurdles and risks engendered by ex-
panding operations.222  
 Capital investment in property, plants, and equipment and the 
costs of manufacturing are higher for biologics than for generic 
drugs.223 For example, cell culture facilities take three to five years to 
construct and cost $250-$450 million, and materials cost twenty to 
one hundred times more than those used for traditional drugs.224 Pro-
fessor Grabowski and his coauthors do point out, however, that, over 
longer time frames, expansion in manufacturing capacity and techno-
                                                                                                                     
 217. Id. at 1296-98.  
 218. Id. at 1296.  
 219. Id. at 1296-97. Extrapolating from figures in Europe, where follow-on biologics 
have been approved, see supra Part VI, the cost of clinical trials for biologics is estimated to 
be ten to forty million dollars, compared to roughly one to two million dollars to demon-
strate bioequivalence for generic drugs. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1293. 
 220. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1297.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.; see also Ansell, supra note 214 (stating that only established biopharmaceuti-
cal firms have the resources to pursue development of biopharmaceuticals, but noting that, 
given that the regulatory demands will prove exacting, such firms are “probably better off 
developing entirely novel biotech products instead”); Lisa Roner, Is the Biogenerics Battle 
About to Heat Up?, EYE FOR PHARMA, Feb. 22, 2006,  
http://www.eyeforpharma.com/index.asp?news=49866 (stating that only a few biogeneric 
firms, namely Sandoz, Teva, BioPartners, ratiopharm, and Stada, have the strong finan-
cial backing and regulatory expertise necessary to support a follow-on protein product 
through the necessary clinical trials). As noted by Professor Grabowski and his coauthors, 
very few biotech companies are mature firms. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1294. 
Most are in the early stages of development and not profitable. Id.  
 223. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1294.   
 224. Id.; see also supra note 30 (describing the high cost of materials for manufacturing 
protein products). 
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logical advances in process engineering could facilitate lower costs for 
follow-on biologics, especially as certain firms choose to specialize in 
generic biologics and others begin to outsource some of their manu-
facturing.225  
 Third, Professor Grabowski and his coauthors expect that pur-
chasers of biologics might not readily accept follow-on products.226 
Even if a biologic has been subject to adequate clinical testing to as-
certain that it is therapeutically equivalent to an existing product, 
some users will be particularly cautious about using follow-on prod-
ucts in the short term.227 Moreover, there has traditionally been less 
substitution of biologics than of drugs. Because many biologic thera-
pies are designed to treat life-threatening diseases and do not have 
close substitutes, managed care organizations have been reluctant in 
the past to restrict access or require the use of generics.228 In addi-
tion, biologics have often been treated as medical benefits under in-
surance plans, rather than as pharmacy benefits, and, therefore, 
have been less subject to centralized formulary controls.229 Nonethe-
less, Professor Grabowski and his coauthors indicate that this situa-
tion is changing and that, once concerns about the safety of follow-on 
biologics are allayed, these products ultimately will be substituted 
for branded ones; the speed at which this change will occur, however, 
is not known.230 Significant debate currently surrounds the question 
whether technology is sufficiently advanced to ensure that follow-on 
protein products are indeed as safe and effective as their 
branded analogues. 
B.   Current Scientific Knowledge Permits an Abbreviated Approval 
Pathway for Certain Follow-On Protein Products 
 While opponents of an abbreviated approval pathway for biologics, 
including many brand firms, assert that current scientific knowledge 
does not permit an abbreviated approval pathway for biologics, pro-
ponents of such legislation, with generic manufacturers foremost 
among them, contend that present day scientific techniques do “sup-
port the approval of most biopharmaceutical products under an ab-
breviated approval pathway.”231 These two groups differ on several 
points, including the ability of scientists, using current technology, to 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1297-98. The authors further note, however, 
that lower costs might not actually be passed on to the consumer, but rather captured by 
new market entrants. Id. at 1298. 
 226. Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1298. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. at 1295. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id.  
 231. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 5.  
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assess innovator and follow-on protein products for comparability, 
whether two biologics produced using different manufacturing proc-
esses can be truly comparable, and whether the immunogenicity pro-
file of most biologics renders them ineligible for an abbreviated ap-
proval pathway. 
1.   It Is Possible, Using Current Scientific Techniques, to Assess 
Follow-On Protein Products for Comparability with Innovator 
Products 
 It is generally acknowledged that, because biologics exhibit a 
great deal of complexity and structural heterogeneity, scientists can-
not fully characterize them at the present time.232 Nevertheless, the 
GPhA maintains that current scientific techniques permit manufac-
turers of follow-on protein products to assess their products for com-
parability with brand products without the need for some or any of 
the preclinical and clinical studies.233 According to the GPhA, a 
manufacturer of a brand biopharmaceutical could “execute a compre-
hensive side-by-side comparative analytical characterization on the 
biopharmaceutical product and the reference product” and if the fol-
low-on protein achieved the requisite standard of comparability, then 
“the need to conduct further studies, such as preclinical, pharma-
cokinetic, pharmacodynamic, or clinical studies could be reduced or 
even eliminated.”234 This scientific capability would allow manufac-
turers of follow-on protein products to benefit from an abbreviated 
approval pathway for follow-on protein products if Congress were to 
implement one. 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Schellekens, supra note 17, at 1357 (stating that biologics cannot “be fully charac-
terized physicochemically by current analytical methods” and that they “show a high de-
gree of heterogeneity (e.g., in glycosylation or in folding)”); Biotechnology Indus. Org., BIO 
Principles on Follow-On Biologics (Mar. 26, 2007), 
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/Principles.asp [hereinafter BIO Principles] 
(stating that biologics are “different and far more complex than most small molecule 
chemical drugs” and that “[d]ue to their size and complexity, biologics generally cannot be 
scientifically characterized to the same degree as small molecule chemical drugs”); GPHA 
SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 7-14 (acknowledging that “no ‘one’ analyti-
cal method is currently capable” of comprehensive characterization of biopharmaceuticals). 
 233. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 7-14; see also The Law of 
Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) 
[hereinafter Hearing on the Law of Biologic Medicine] (statement of William Schultz, Part-
ner, Zuckerman Spaeder L.L.P., on Behalf of the Generic Pharmaceutical Association), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1239&wit_id=3627 (stating that 
“analytical scientific techniques and methods have rapidly advanced over the past decade” 
such that “[c]omparative studies between the brand biopharmaceutical product and the 
generic biopharmaceutical have shown similarity in the primary, secondary, and tertiary 
structures of these products”). 
 234. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 8. 
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 GPhA further explains that there are two possible characteriza-
tion methods for biologics: absolute and comparative.235 Absolute 
characterization involves comprehensive analysis of the product at 
the atomic level; for example, characterization could include “deter-
mination of the complete three-dimensional structure of a protein at 
the atomic level.”236 As explained by the GPhA, “absolute characteri-
zation is the norm for the vast majority of small molecular pharma-
ceutical products, but is much less common for biopharmaceuti-
cals.”237 
 According to the GPhA, however, absolute characterization of bio-
logics is not essential in developing follow-on biologics, because com-
parative characterization is more relevant in assessing comparabil-
ity.238 An analysis of a biologic as compared to a reference product 
would aim to determine the degree of similarity of the two products 
“in all meaningful ways,” without fully characterizing either the ref-
erence or the follow-on biologics in absolute terms.239 The GPhA cites 
as an example that a comparative characterization would not reveal 
the complete three-dimensional structure of both proteins at the 
atomic level, but rather compare their degree of similarity or dissimi-
larity by using various analytical methods that would “detect any dif-
ferences in the three-dimensional structures of the two proteins.”240 
According to the GPhA, since the goal of such characterization is “to 
assess comparability between the two products,” methods that per-
mit detection of a biochemical “fingerprint” are useful even if these 
“methods do not enable complete description of [either] product in 
absolute terms.”241  
 The GPhA asserts that comparative analysis is presently techno-
logically possible for “most, if not all” biologics.242 Indeed, the GPhA 
asserts that each time brand firms alter their manufacturing proc-
esses, they are already able to assess the comparability of their prod-
ucts prior and subsequent to such change,243 even with respect to 
                                                                                                                     
 235. Id. at 9.  
 236. Id.  
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 10 (“The distinction between absolute and comparative characterization is 
critical, because only comparative characterization is relevant to the determination of simi-
lar [sic] of two biopharmaceuticals.”). 
 239. Id. at 9-10. 
 240. Id. at 10. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 10-11. For a brief mention of the current analytical technology supporting 
absolute and comparative characterization, see id. at 11. 
 243. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 7 (“A within-manufacturer 
comparison could arise when a pioneer seeks to change its process, formulation, manufac-
turing site, etc.”); Hearing on the Law of Biologic Medicine, supra note 233 (testimony of 
William Shultz) (“Changes to the manufacturing process for generic biopharmaceuticals 
are addressed in the same manner as brand manufacturers in that comparability between 
the product prior and subsequent to such change is established.”).  
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highly complex products, in order to detect changes that may affect 
the safety and efficacy of their biologics.244 Further, GPhA contends 
that an appropriate combination of analyses “can provide compre-
hensive comparative characterization of all clinically meaningful 
properties of a biopharmaceutical” and that such results “are often 
more sensitive to product changes than are clinical studies.”245  
 The GPhA asserts that, once the differences between the reference 
and follow-on product have been determined, the next step is to de-
velop criteria to determine when products will be considered suffi-
ciently similar analytically so that their clinical effect will be ex-
pected to be comparable.246 The GPhA maintains that “[t]he greater 
the extent of characterization” of the reference and test biologics, 
“and the closer the match between [them], the greater the assurance 
of comparable clinical effect,” which, therefore, reduces the need for 
pre-clinical and clinical testing.247 The GPhA suggests that, when as-
sessing the degree of comparability of the reference and test prod-
ucts, one must take into account the fact that biological products are 
inherently variable, some more so than others, and therefore, a 
rather wide range of values for each analytical parameter should 
be accepted.248  
 For its part, BIO strongly disagrees with the GPhA that analytical 
tests, unaccompanied by pre-clinical and clinical tests, would “pro-
                                                                                                                     
 244. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 10 (“Indeed, it is precisely 
this type of comparative characterization that brand firms employ routinely in comparabil-
ity studies, even on highly complex, heterogeneous products, to detect changes relevant to 
safety and efficacy.”). See infra Part VI.B.2. and accompanying text, regarding the question 
whether two biologics produced using different manufacturing processes can be truly com-
parable.  
 245. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 11; see also Safe and Af-
fordable Biotech Drugs—The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 3-5 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Biotech 
Drugs] (testimony of Theresa L. Gerrard, TLG Consulting Inc.), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070326121929-50046.pdf (stating that the “criti-
cally important point” is that the “FDA recognized that analytical testing was far more 
sensitive in the ability to detect product changes than a typical clinical trial” and explain-
ing that this is due to the fact that “variation among people in their response to a bio-
pharmaceutical does not allow one to detect subtle product differences”).  
 246. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 14. 
 247. Id. The GPhA proposes that, since the complexity of biologic products varies along 
a continuum, the FDA should take into account the particular characteristics of the prod-
uct in question when determining when to require submission of pre-clinical and clinical 
studies. Id. at 3-4. For example, some proteins, such as inteferons, are relatively simple, 
whereas others, such as erythropoetin, are more complex because they are glycosylated. 
See id. at 4 (noting the “continuum of product complexity” for protein products and stating 
that the FDA should take this into account when devising an abbreviated approval path-
way); Hearing on the Law of Biologic Medicine, supra note 233 (testimony of William 
Shultz) (stating that “a simple protein, such as interferon, should have a reduced preclini-
cal and clinical program when compared to a glycosylated protein (proteins with sugar 
molecules), such as erythropoetin”).  
 248. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 14-15.  
594  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:555 
 
vide sufficient evidence to justify approval of a follow-on protein,” cit-
ing two reasons for its view.249 First, BIO contends that such tests are 
specific to the particular manufacturing process used and therefore 
“completely irrelevant to a similar product developed through a dif-
ferent manufacturing process by another company.”250 Second, BIO 
maintains that “although testing technology is rapidly evolving, cur-
rent analytical tests remain limited in their ability to detect product 
variations that may affect clinical safety and effectiveness.”251 
 With respect to its first claim, that analytical testing is process-
specific, BIO explains that  
Throughout the manufacturing process, the protein mixture is sub-
ject to various tests to ensure characteristics such as structure, 
and potency, as well as the absence of impurities and contami-
nants. However, analytical tests performed by the innovator may 
rely on testing limits and criteria that have been shown to be valid 
only with respect to a particular process, and/or may involve pro-
prietary reagents and equipment. . . . For this reason, it can be dif-
ficult to establish a “standard” or “uniform” array of analytical 
tests for use with particular types or classes of products.252 
 In terms of its second contention, that analytical tests cannot de-
tect all clinically significant product variations, BIO asserts that “it 
can be difficult for a manufacturer to identify appropriate analytical 
technologies to detect/explain changes when the biochemical basis for 
the changes is unknown.”253 What is more, “a high degree of analyti-
cal correlation between an innovator and follow-on product might not 
translate into the same degree of clinical quality, safety, or effective-
ness, while analytically dissimilar products may have similar safety 
and effectiveness profiles.”254 
 In sum, while acknowledging improvements in analytical technol-
ogy and allowing that it may be possible for follow-on manufacturers 
“to conduct certain analytical correlation assessments,” BIO asserts 
that “laboratory assays . . . cannot currently be used as surrogates for 
establishing high quality, safety, and effectiveness of a follow-on pro-
                                                                                                                     
 249. Letter from Sara Radcliffe, Managing Dir., Sci. and Regulatory Affairs, Biotech-
nology Indus. Org., to FDA 30 (Dec. 13, 2004), available at www.bio.org/reg/20041213.pdf 
[hereinafter Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA]. 
 250. Id. Indeed, BIO rejects the use of the term “comparability” in describing the rela-
tionship between reference and follow-on products, maintaining that this term should be 
“restricted to ‘intra-manufacturer’ situations; e.g., to describe the relationship between a 
manufacturer’s product before and after manufacturing changes.” Id. at 10-11. According 
to BIO, any true assessment of comparability requires historical data about the manufac-
turing process and the product, proprietary information to which a follow-on manufacturer 
would not be privy. Id. at 10-13. 
 251. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 30. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 31. 
 254. Id. 
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tein,” because “differences (and the absence of differences) detected 
using a combination of biochemical and bioassay assessments cannot 
fully predict clinical safety or efficacy consequences.”255 
 The FDA, the body responsible for assessing the safety and effec-
tiveness of drugs and biologics, takes a view somewhere between the 
GPhA and BIO. The FDA has indicated that it is possible, using cur-
rent characterization techniques, to accurately assess relatively sim-
ple follow-on protein products for comparability with reference prod-
ucts without requiring clinical trials, but that it is not possible to do 
so for more complex protein products. Testifying before the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in March 2007, Dr. 
Janet Woodcock, Deputy Commissioner for Operations at the FDA, 
stated that “the ability to predict the clinical comparability of two 
products depends on our understanding of the relationship between 
the structural characteristics of the protein and its function, as well 
as on our ability to demonstrate structural similarity between the 
follow-on protein and the reference product.”256 She added that while 
such a comparison “may be currently possible for some relatively 
simple protein products, technology is not yet sufficiently advanced 
to allow this type of comparison for more complex protein prod-
ucts.”257 With respect to these more complex protein products, Dr. 
Woodcock stated that the FDA may require clinical trials on a case-
by-case basis and that future scientific advances may enable the 
agency to approve follow-on protein products based solely on charac-
terization.258 Nonetheless, Dr. Woodcock urges Congress to “ ‘leave 
room for the evolving science,’ ” predicting that “ ‘within this decade 
we will be able to characterize some of the very simple proteins well 
enough that we will probably be able to decide that they’re similar 
enough to an innovator product.’ ”259  
 House Bill 1038 contains specific statutory language addressing 
the issue of similarity of biological products.260 The bill would require 
an abbreviated biological product application to include data demon-
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 31-32. 
 256. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 6, at 9 (testimony of Dr. Janet Woodcock). 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at 8-10.  
 259. RUCKER, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting Dr. Janet Woodcock) (citation omitted). FDA 
officials do, however, acknowledge the current difficulty of assessing the similarity of a ref-
erence biologic and a follow-on product; see also E-mail from Dr. Emily Shacter, Chief, Lab. 
of Biochemistry, Div. of Therapeutic Proteins, Office of Biotechnology Prods., Ctr. for Drug 
Evaluation & Research, FDA, to Donna M. Gitter, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical 
Studies, Fordham Univ. Schs. of Bus. (Apr. 23, 2007, 12:44 PM) (on file with author) [here-
inafter April 23rd E-mail from Dr. Emily Shacter] (stating that “we don’t necessarily know 
what to do if and when differences are seen (and they WILL be seen; it’s just the nature of 
the beast)” and adding that “the term ‘similarity’ is a poor choice and is a bit misleading. 
How similar? How do you define ‘similar[?]’ ”).  
 260. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(1)(B) (2007). 
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strating, inter alia, that “the biological product and reference product 
contain highly similar principal molecular structural features.”261 
House Bill 1038 then describes various scenarios where two protein 
products that differ in certain ways would still be deemed “highly 
similar.”262 Some commentators have expressed concerns about the 
bill’s provisions for assessing similarity.  
 Testifying in March 2007 before the Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions regarding Senate Bill 623, the com-
panion bill to House Bill 1038,263 Dr. Jay P. Siegel of Johnson & 
Johnson critiqued, on scientific grounds, the statutory language in 
Senate Bill 623 setting forth when two protein products will be con-
sidered “highly similar” and therefore eligible for a demonstration of 
comparability pursuant to that statute.264 First, the legislation would 
consider protein products with “minor differences in amino acid se-
quence” to be considered “highly similar.”265 According to Dr. Siegel, 
differences in even just one amino acid “often have adverse effects on 
the molecule, with the potential to pose great danger to patients.”266 
What is more, Senate Bill 623 would also consider two protein prod-
ucts to be “highly similar” and eligible for a demonstration of compa-
rability under the statute where the products’ differences are “solely 
due to post-translational events.”267 Dr. Siegel asserts that “ ‘[p]ost-
translational modification’ refers to the important processes that oc-
cur after the backbone of a protein has been synthesized” and “can 
result in major chemical modifications of the protein” that may sig-
nificantly impact its “activity, half-life in circulation, and immuno-
genicity.”268 He contends that many post-translational modifications 
are “so profound, they should simply be considered to make the bio-
logic a different biologic, requiring a full application.”269 Senate Bill 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. The text of the two bills is identical.  
 264. See Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 10-13 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel). 
 265. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(1)(B)(i) (providing that two protein biological products will be 
deemed “to contain highly similar principal molecular structural features” where they have 
“minor differences in amino acid sequence”); id. § 3(k)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that two glycosy-
lated protein biological products will be deemed “to contain highly similar principal mo-
lecular structural features” where they have “minor differences in amino acid sequence”). 
 266. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel). 
 267. See H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(1)(B)(i) (providing that two protein biological products will 
be deemed “to contain highly similar principal molecular structural features” where the 
differences in structure between them are “solely due to post-translational events”); id. § 
3(k)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that two glycosylated protein biological products will be deemed 
“to contain highly similar principal molecular structural features” where the differences in 
structure between them are “solely due to post-translational events”). 
 268. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 11-12 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel). 
 269. Id. at 12.  
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623 also deems “highly similar” any “[c]losely related, complex partly 
definable biological products with similar therapeutic intent, such as 
two live viral products for the same indication.”270 Dr. Siegel main-
tains that this provision “allows abbreviated applications for living 
cells and organisms and other biologic products far more complex 
and difficult to define than proteins” and asserts that since these 
products are only partly definable, there is “no scientifically valid ba-
sis for determination that they are comparable.”271 In his view, in 
most cases, all of the aforementioned differences give rise to a need 
for full clinical testing of the follow-on products comparable to that 
initially required of the innovator products.272  
 Dr. Siegel also opposes House Bill 1038’s provisions concerning 
interchangeability, stating that “[n]o follow-on biologic product 
should be considered interchangeable with its reference product.”273 
Senate Bill 623 provides that a biological product shall be deemed 
“interchangeable” and therefore substitutable for the reference prod-
uct274 where the follow-on product is comparable to the reference 
product and “can be expected to produce the same clinical result as 
the reference product in any given patient.”275 Dr. Sigel maintains 
that “[n]o amount of non-clinical testing of a biologic product can en-
sure or predict it will have identical effects to another product” and 
that the very concept of interchangeability is dangerous considering 
the risk of clinically important differences between the products.276 
Indeed, the FDA acknowledged in a submission to the World Health 
Organization, in the context of a discussion of international nonpro-
                                                                                                                     
 270. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(1)(B)(v). 
 271. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel). 
 272. See id. at 11-12 (advocating for full, not abbreviated, applications for protein 
products that present minor differences in amino acid sequence, differences “due solely to 
post-translational events,” and “ ‘closely related, complex partly definable biological prod-
ucts with similar therapeutic intent’ (for example, two live viral products for the same in-
dication)” (quoting S. 623, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(1)(B)(v) (2007)). 
 273. Id. at 13.  
 274. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text regarding the significance of a des-
ignation of interchangeability. 
 275. H.R. 1038, § 2(a)(5)(B). 
 276. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 14 (testimony of Dr. Jay P. 
Siegel). Dr. Siegel also expresses concern that the designation of interchangeability, which 
would lead patients to switch between therapies, would render it more difficult to attribute 
emergent adverse events to a specific therapy. Id. He posits that this situation “could se-
verely impair the ability of pharmacovigilance systems to deal with emerging safety prob-
lems.” Id. at 15; see also Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in 
the United States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on 
Health, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Biosimilar Policy] (statement of Dr. 
David Schenkein, Vice President, Clinical Hematology/Oncology, Genentech, on behalf of 
the Biotechnology Indus. Org.), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/ 
110-he-hrg.050207.Schenkein-testimony.pdf (stating that “[t]he ability to detect that a new 
follow-on biologic has a significantly higher risk would be highly impaired and . . . could 
go unnoticed”). 
598  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:555 
 
prietary names for biologics, that as of September 2006, “[w]ith pro-
tein products, . . . the FDA has not determined how interchangeabil-
ity can be established for complex proteins.”277  
 Other industry professionals disagree with Dr. Siegel’s conclu-
sions, however. In terms of comparability, Dr. Ajaz Hussain, Vice 
President and Global Head of Biopharmaceutical Development at 
Sandoz, a generic division of Novartis,278 stresses that the biologics 
industry and the FDA already “accept that batch-to-batch variation 
is inevitable for biologics.”279 Under accepted comparability principles 
for already-approved reference products, so long as subsequent 
batches meet certain parameters, they are made available to the pub-
lic. Dr. Hussain therefore rejects any “sameness” requirements for 
follow-on products that are not the current regulatory standards and 
instead calls for “consistent and appropriate regulatory standards 
applied to all biologics independent of their sponsor.”280  
 With respect to interchangeability, Dr. Schwieterman, formerly 
an FDA official and most recently an independent consultant to the 
brand biopharmaceutical industry as well as to firms interested in 
biogenerics,281 declares “without hesitation, that adequate scientific 
tools currently exist to assess and deem certain products as inter-
changeable.”282 Dr. Ganesh Venkataraman, cofounder and Senior 
Vice President of Research at Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc.283 
claims that “[w]hile interchangeability may not be possible for most 
                                                                                                                     
 277. FDA, U.S. FDA Considerations: Discussion by National Regulatory Authorities 
with World Health Organization (WHO) On Possible International Non-proprietary Name 
(INN) Policies for Biosimilars (Sept. 1, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/cder/news/biosimilars.htm. 
 278. Dr. Hussain emphasizes that, as a representative of Novartis, which he describes 
as “unique among pharmaceutical companies because it has made large investments in 
both branded and generic drugs,” he represents a “balanced” position with respect to fol-
low-on biologics rather than a position biased by commercial interests on one side of the 
question. Follow-On Biologics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Ajaz Hussain, Ph.D., Vice President & 
Global Head of Biopharmaceutical Development, Sandoz, on behalf of the Novartis Group 
of Companies), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_08/Hussain.pdf. 
 279. Id. at 5.  
 280. Id. Dr. Hussain warns that one unintended consequence of a sameness standard 
is that even brand firms might not meet this requirement from one batch to the next, re-
sulting in a situation where patients cannot get access to sorely needed biologic prod-
ucts. Id.  
 281. See Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs—The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [herein-
after Hearing on Biotech Drugs] (statement of Dr. William Schwieterman), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070326121827-46231.pdf. 
 282. Id. at 8. 
 283. Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs—The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hearing on Biotech Drugs] (statement of Dr. Ganesh Venkataraman, Momenta Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20070326121658-
50108.pdf. Momenta’s research and development focuses on both generic as well as novel 
drug candidates. Id. at 3.  
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biologics today, it is well within reach in the near term for a number 
of products.”284 As noted by Dr. Schwieterman, given the current 
state of scientific understanding and the importance to patients of 
access to safe, effective, and affordable biologics, the FDA should be 
given “legislative authority to use scientific data and make critical 
judgments to determine, when appropriate, that two products are in-
terchangeable.”285 
2.   Two Biologics Produced Using Different Manufacturing 
Processes Can Be Truly Comparable 
 In addressing whether two biologics can be comparable even if 
they are manufactured using different processes, the GPhA asserts 
that the focus in evaluating follow-on protein products for safety and 
efficacy should be on the end product, rather than the process, which 
is not an end in itself.286 According to the GPhA, the essential ele-
ments of the manufacturing process include robustness, reproducibil-
ity, validation, controls, and testing, and if the appropriate standards 
are maintained for these features, the follow-on protein product is 
likely to meet the requisite standards for identity, potency, purity, 
quality, and safety.287 The GPhA emphasizes that an analytical com-
parability exercise can demonstrate comparability of the reference 
and follow-on products, notwithstanding their different means 
of manufacture.288  
 The GPhA position is buttressed by the May 2007 congressional 
testimony of independent consultant Dr. Schwieterman.289 He ex-
plains that, in the last fifteen years, scientific advances have permit-
ted the FDA to apply comparability principles to allow postapproval 
changes in brand biopharmaceuticals, even for very significant 
                                                                                                                     
 284. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 283, at 4 (testimony of Dr. Ganesh Venka-
taraman). 
 285. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 281, at 9 (testimony of Dr. William 
Schwieterman). It should be noted that another proposed legislative bill, the Patient Pro-
tection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives by Representative Jay Inslee (D-WA) in April 2007, would amend the PHSA to 
authorize the FDA to approve “similar” biological products but would preclude any deter-
mination of interchangeability. H.R. 1956, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:h1956ih.txt.pdf.  
 286. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 17 (“The process is, there-
fore, not the end in and of itself, but rather a means to achieve the end. The objective is 
really a final product (composition) that is approvable. Any reproducible process that yields 
a final product that matches the desired composition (based on comparability to the refer-
ence product) should, therefore, be equally acceptable.”). 
 287. Id. at 18. 
 288. Id. “Specific aspects of the manufacturing process do not determine the character-
istics of a protein product. . . . An analytical comparability exercise should be conducted to 
demonstrate comparability of the biopharmaceutical product[s] to the reference prod-
uct.” Id.  
 289. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
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manufacturing changes, such as cell line replacements and reloca-
tions of the manufacturing facility site.290 According to Dr. 
Schwieterman, “[c]ontrary to what others may say, the scientific evi-
dence has not required the vast majority of post-approval brand 
product changes to be supported by large clinical outcome studies.”291 
Instead, the FDA relies on analytic tests to assess molecular struc-
ture along with, when needed, “short-term assessments of the phar-
macokinetics (assessing blood levels in various tissues) and pharma-
codynamics (assessing the short-term impact of the agent on labora-
tory parameters),” studies that typically involve fewer than one hun-
dred patients and last just weeks.292 Dr. Schwieterman notes that:  
Large clinical outcome studies are indispensable for determining 
the safety and efficacy of a new and untested agent. However, they 
are often poor tools for use in comparing differences between two 
different agents unless the studies are made to include 1000s of 
patients—which may or may not reveal the difference in the prod-
uct, [sic] In fact, I can think of only one example where the FDA 
required a large clinical outcome study for a product—yet the FDA 
first deemed the product not comparable due to analytic and 
pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic measures.293 
Thus, Dr. Schwieterman states his belief 
that based on the wealth of experience with brand post-approval 
manufacturing changes in the biopharmaceutical industry, the 
evidence clearly demonstrates that comparability processes 
                                                                                                                     
 290. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 281, at 4 (testimony of Dr. William 
Schwieterman). Another former FDA official and independent consultant to the biotech in-
dustry, Dr. Theresa L. Gerrard, concurs in this view. See Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra 
note 245, at 2 (testimony of Theresa L. Gerrard). She notes that the FDA developed scien-
tific policies on comparability in the 1990s at the behest of the innovator biotech manufac-
turers who “pressed FDA for this change” so as to avoid the need for clinical trials after 
each manufacturing process change, “rightly claim[ing] that their biopharmaceuticals were 
so well characterized.” Id. Dr. Gerrard cites two complex biologic products, Biogen’s 
Avonex and IsnMed’s Iplex, as ones for which the manufacturers changed the cell line, the 
purification scheme, and additionally for Avonex, the manufacturing site. Id. at 4. Dr. Ger-
rard further notes that since 1996, CBER no longer requires a separate license for each 
manufacturing facility during the biologic approval process, thereby indicating the “FDA’s 
growing confidence in its ability to determine comparability, and thus, safety and efficacy, 
based on results from analytical testing of the finished product, independent of the manu-
facturing process” and the agency’s recognition “that in most cases analytical testing could 
support these changes without [the] need for retesting the product in clinical trials.” Id. 
at 3.  
 291. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 281, at 4 (testimony of Dr. William 
Schwieterman). But see Hearing on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 276, at 8 (testimony of 
Dr. David Schenkein) (stating that “[w]hen a biologics manufacturer makes a substantial 
change to its process (e.g., new cell line), given the incomplete ability of laboratory testing 
to identify or predict differences, FDA requires substantial testing in humans (clinical test-
ing) to validate the comparability of the product”). 
 292. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 281, at 6 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
liam Schwieterman).  
 293. Id. at 6-7. 
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soundly support the approval of biogenerics without the need for 
large and questionable clinical trials which for most products, 
would needlessly delay access to affordable life-saving medi-
cines.294  
 In contrast, BIO asserts that the adage “the ‘product is the proc-
ess’ ” exemplifies the potentially critical impact that even minor 
manufacturing changes can have on a protein product.295 The manu-
facture of protein products involves “numerous highly variable and 
specialized steps,”296 and even a slight change in any one of these 
could have a negative clinical impact.297 BIO cites several examples of 
cases where innovator companies intentionally effectuated changes 
in their manufacturing processes that resulted in unanticipated al-
terations in the final product.298  
 BIO also denies the GPhA’s assertion that the manufacture of a 
follow-on product is analogous to an innovator’s change in its manu-
facturing process.299 BIO contends that “[w]hile the scope and scale 
for intra-manufacturer manufacturing process changes are almost 
always limited, the scope and scale of differences for a follow-on 
product necessarily would be extensive.”300 For example, BIO points 
out that there would be numerous differences between the manufac-
turing processes of an innovator protein product and a follow-on, in-
cluding “cell line, raw materials, manufacturing process and process 
controls, test methods, reference materials, specifications, con-
tainer/closure system, and manufacturing and testing facilities.”301 
Moreover, follow-on manufacturers lack “the particular extensive 
knowledge of a specific product’s manufacturing history and critical 
product quality attributes to guide them through product develop-
ment,” which are typically protected as trade secrets.302  
                                                                                                                     
 294. Id. at 7. 
 295. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 18. 
 296. Id. at 19; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 29.  
 298. Id. at 21-28 (citing examples of manufacturing changes with respect to several 
protein products and the resultant impact on the products in terms of immunogenicity, po-
tency, pharmacokinetics, bioavailability, and purity). 
 299. Letter from Sara Radcliffe, Managing Dir., Sci. and Regulatory Affairs, Biotech-
nology Indus. Org., to FDA 4 (Mar. 16, 2005) [hereinafter March 16, 2005 BIO Letter to 
FDA], available at http://www.bio.org/reg/20050316.pdf (“[T]he manufacture of a follow-on 
product is not analogous to innovators making manufacturing changes.”). See supra notes 
286-88 and accompanying text for the GPhA’s view. 
 300. Mar. 16, 2005 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 299, at 3. 
 301. Id. at 3-4. 
 302. Id. at 4; see also Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 19 (“Much of 
the knowledge and data about the manufacturing process are proprietary to the innovator 
and therefore would be unavailable to follow-on manufacturers.”); id. at 29 (“A manufac-
turer attempting to make a follow-on product may certainly be as technically capable as 
the innovator manufacturer, but often will lack critical product-specific information to 
evaluate the impact of using a process that is different from that of the innovator.”). 
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 In his March 2007 congressional testimony, Johnson & Johnson’s 
Dr. Siegel explains the types of critical manufacturing information 
that follow-on manufacturers would lack, thereby limiting their abil-
ity to identify clinically important differences short of clinical test-
ing.303 First, “[w]hen a manufacturer makes [a] substantial change[] 
in its manufacturing process, that manufacturer is able to compare 
not only final product but also various components and intermediates 
that are produced during various stages of the new and old manufac-
turing process.”304 “Such comparisons may detect important differ-
ences that remain in the final product, but at [low] levels” that might 
not otherwise be detected.305 In contrast, follow-on manufacturers 
will not have access to these intermediate products, and will conduct 
their comparisons using only the final, marketed reference product.306  
 Second, unlike follow-on manufacturers, brand firms possess 
years of experience comparing their products before and after manu-
facturing changes.307 This experience affords them an understanding 
of which parameters are essential for ensuring safety and efficacy of 
the molecule, the best approaches for assessing this information, and 
which differences are clinically important.308 Thus, in light of the im-
portance of the manufacturing process, BIO and its members believe 
that follow-on manufacturers must perform clinical studies in all 
cases to assure safety and effectiveness of their products.309   
 Some FDA officials have expressed their concordance with the 
GPhA position that two biologics can achieve comparability even if 
they are manufactured using different processes, at least with re-
spect to recombinant products created through genetic engineering, 
as opposed to naturally-derived ones such as blood- and tissue-
derived products and vaccines.310 This view was presented at a De-
                                                                                                                     
 303. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 4 (testimony of Dr. Jay P. 
Siegel). 
 304. Id.  
 305. Id.   
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 4-5.  
 308. Id.  
 309. Mar. 16, 2005 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 299, at 4 (“We believe that, in all 
cases, follow-on manufacturers would need to perform adequate clinical studies to assure 
safety and effectiveness of their protein products.”); see also Hearing on Follow-On Biolog-
ics, supra note 22, at 5 (testimony of Dr. Jay P. Siegel) (stating his belief that “there will 
always be a need (in the foreseeable future) for some amount of clinical testing of a follow-
on biologic,” though the “amount and type of testing will depend on the specifics of the 
products and assessment of potential risks”). 
 310. See E-mail from Dr. Emily Shacter, Chief, Lab. of Biochemistry, Div. of Therapeu-
tic Proteins, Office of Biotechnology Prods., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, 
to Donna M. Gitter, Assistant Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham Univ. Schs. 
of Bus. (Apr. 20, 2007, 10:11 AM) (on file with author) [hereinafter April 20th E-Mail from 
Dr. Emily Shacter] (expressing the opinion of some FDA officials that, at least for certain 
biologics, comparability with a reference product could be achieved even using a different 
manufacturing process).  
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cember 2005 public workshop titled Scientific Issues in Assessing the 
Similarity of Follow-on Protein Products, cosponsored by the FDA, 
along with the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST)311 and the New York Academy of Sciences (NYAS).312 In her 
presentation entitled Follow-On Biologics Workshop Meeting Goals 
and Outcomes, the FDA’s Dr. Emily Shacter explained that, at least 
for recombinant proteins (though not for naturally-derived products), 
the manufacturing process “impacts but does not necessarily define 
the product,” and therefore “[i]f you can define the desired endpoint 
(product), [you] can probably design the process to achieve that prod-
uct (‘reverse engineering’).”313 Dr. Shacter explains why the manufac-
turing process is less important for recombinant proteins as follows: 
One of the main differences between a recombinant protein and 
one that is naturally-derived is in the complexity and multiple bio-
logical activities found in the source material. Blood has hundreds 
of proteins, all of which have biological activities in humans. Most 
are in low abundance and require complex purification processes 
that may or may not be able to remove all impurities, and these 
can be difficult to identify and quantify. Even very low levels of 
some blood proteins can pose significant safety issues. So you want 
the intended protein product and impurities to be highly consistent 
and reflective of the “mixture” tested in clinical safety and efficacy 
trials. In contrast, recombinant proteins are over-expressed in cell 
lines (like E. coli and Chinese Hamster Ovary (CHO) cells), so the 
protein of interest is the most abundant protein in the gemische, 
and the residual host cell proteins generally have been extensively 
                                                                                                                     
 311. NIST is a nonregulatory federal agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and is charged with promoting “U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advanc-
ing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic secu-
rity and improve . . . quality of life.” National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gen-
eral Information, http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general2.htm (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 312. The New York Academy of Sciences (NYAS) is an “independent, nonprofit, mem-
bership-based organization” that describes itself as “one of the world’s foremost organizers 
of scientific conferences and symposia.” N.Y. Acad. of Scis., About the Academy, 
http://www.nyas.org/about/index.asp (last visited June 23, 2008). On its Web site, the 
NYAS emphasizes the scientifically objective information presented at the December 2005 
public workshops, declaring that “[t]o obtain the most objective, state-of-the-art input, 
speakers primarily from academia and government were invited to speak, including scien-
tists from the USA and Europe” and that “[t]here were no speakers from the regulated in-
dustry or from potential FOB [follow-on biologic] manufacturers.” Angelo DePalma, The 
New York Academy of Sciences, Follow-On Biologics Workshop, Overview, (May 3, 2006), 
http://www.nyas.org/ebriefreps/main.asp?intEBriefID=477. 
 313. Presentation, Dr. Emily Shacter, Chief, Lab. of Biochemistry, Div. of Therapeutic 
Proteins, Office of Biotechnology Prods., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA (Dec. 
14, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/follow_on/200512/200512_shacter_wrapup.pdf. Dr. Shacter notes 
that these statements represent the consensus view of the FDA and NIST officials who ar-
ranged the December 2005 public workshops on follow-on protein products. Id. However, 
she has explained that “like with other huge and complex organizations, the formulation of 
controversial FDA policies also involves higher management, political appointees, and 
lawyers, and there is sometimes a disconnect between the major policies that we might 
recommend.” April 20th E-Mail from Dr. Emily Shacter, supra note 310.  
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studied and have a well known safety profile. The process used to 
manufacture recombinant proteins is still important, but becomes 
less so as our ability to analyze highly-purified products in-
creases.314 
As noted by Dr. Shacter, reverse engineering would be possible for 
recombinant protein products, though not for naturally-derived 
products at the present time.315 Moreover, “as analytical and purifica-
tion processes advance, so will our ability [to] reverse engineer a 
naturally-derived protein product.”316 
3.   The Immunogenicity Profile of Most Biologics Renders Them 
Eligible for an Abbreviated Approval Pathway 
 “Immunogenicity” refers to “an allergic response that can origi-
nate in the manufacturing process and from intrinsic properties of 
the biologic.”317 The GPhA emphasizes that this issue pertains to all 
biologics, not just follow-on products, and in any event is not always 
a harmful phenomenon, as “many therapeutic proteins generate an-
tibodies with no clinical consequence.”318 For those cases where im-
munogenicity is a concern (for example, where hypersensitivity reac-
tions have occurred after administration of a brand protein product), 
the GPhA notes that because these incidences are rare, “it is unlikely 
that clinical trials would be useful in addressing whether a biophar-
maceutical product was different from the reference product in the 
induction of hypersensitivity.”319 The GPhA therefore proposes a risk 
management approach, advocating the use of advanced technological 
tools in order to assess those products that pose the greatest danger 
of immunogenicity.320 As noted by Dr. Schwieterman, the FDA cur-
rently uses an arsenal of scientific techniques, including assessments 
of aggregation, analytic studies, and, in some cases, clinical data, and 
postmarketing safety studies, in order to evaluate the immunogenic-
ity of brand products that undergo postapproval manufacturing 
                                                                                                                     
 314. April 20th E-Mail from Dr. Emily Shacter, supra note 310.  
 315. Id.  
 316. Id.  
 317. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 4.  
 318. GPHA SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 28, at 23. The GPhA also empha-
sizes that conventional drug products have been known to induce hypersensitivity reac-
tions, but that the FDA has not required immunogenicity testing in this context. See id.  
 319. See id. As explained by the GPhA, in order to assess immunogenicity accurately, a 
clinical trial would need to be huge and would therefore prove impractical. See id. at 24.  
 320. See id. at 23-24 (explaining that aggregation is “the primary product factor asso-
ciated with immunogenicity” and describing the advanced techniques available for per-
forming analytical testing of biologics for aggregation so as to minimize the potential for 
immunogenicity). As explained by one scientist, “[t]o a far greater extent than small mole-
cules, biologics frequently can bind to themselves to form pairs or aggregates.” Hearing on 
Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 3 (testimony of Dr. Jay P. Siegel). 
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changes on a case-by-case basis.321 An abbreviated approval pathway 
for follow-on biologics would allow the agency to do the same for fol-
low-on protein products. Thus, Dr. Schwieterman concludes that 
“[w]hile immunogenicity is an important consideration for both 
brands and biogenerics, it is not an obstacle to their development.”322  
 BIO agrees with the GPhA that immunogenicity is of great con-
cern only in rare cases,323 but nevertheless cautions that “when clini-
cally relevant immunogenic responses do occur they can have serious 
consequences including hypersensitivity, severe allergic or anaphy-
lactic responses, or autoimmunity to endogenous proteins.”324 BIO 
emphasizes that the causes of immunogenicity are unclear and offers 
examples of cases where analytical studies of the molecular structure 
of protein products failed to accurately predict immunogenic 
events.325 In particular, BIO cites the case of Eprex®, a biologic prod-
uct made by Johnson & Johnson to treat anemia and sold in 
Europe.326 In 1998, Johnson & Johnson changed the stabilizer in its 
Eprex® formulation at the request of European authorities due to 
concern in Europe that the original stabilizer could transmit Mad 
                                                                                                                     
 321. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United 
States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Health, 
110th Cong. 8 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on Biosimilar Policy] (testimony of Dr. William 
Schwieterman), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/cmte_mtgs/110-he-
hrg.050207.Schwieterman-testimony.pdf. What is more, another industry expert has 
pointed out that whereas “[m]any brand biopharmaceutical products were approved in an 
era when the importance of testing for aggregates was not recognized” and testing proce-
dures for these products may not have changed since the original FDA approval, new bio-
logics approved by the FDA today, including follow-on protein products, would be tested for 
aggregation. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 245, at 6 (testimony of Theresa L. Ger-
rard). 
 322. Hearing on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 321, at 8 (testimony of Dr. William 
Schwieterman); see also Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 245, at 6 (testimony of 
Theresa L. Gerrard) (“While immunogenicity is an important consideration for biogenerics, 
it is certainly not a hurdle to their development.”).  
 323. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 33 (stating that “for the vast 
majority of protein products immunogenic responses are not a concern, and differences in 
immunogenicity are not always clinically relevant”). The branded industry disagrees, how-
ever, with the GPhA’s contention that if an immunogenic event for an innovator product is 
too rare to be detected in a clinical program then clinical testing for its follow-on should be 
minimal. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) argues 
that “[a] rare or unusual immunogenic event triggered by one factor related to one biologic, 
does not guarantee that such an event will be just as rare when triggered by another factor 
related to the follow-on product.” Letter from Dr. Caroline J. Loew, Vice President, Scien-
tific and Regulatory Affairs, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of America (PhRMA), to FDA, At-
tachment A, at 12 (Nov, 12, 2004) [hereinafter PhRMA Letter to FDA], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03p0176/03p-0176-c000003-Tab-A-vol3.pdf. 
 324. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 33; see also BIO Petition, su-
pra note 7, at 45 (stating that immunogenicity causes a patient “to produce antibodies that 
may inactivate a therapeutic protein resulting in loss of efficacy and disease progression, or 
may inactivate one of the body’s naturally occurring proteins resulting in side effects that 
can be severe”). 
 325. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 23, 34-35. 
 326. Id. at 28.  
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Cow Disease.327 Subsequently, there was an increase of a serious dis-
order called pure red cell aplasia among patients taking Eprex®.328 
Patients suffering from this disorder suffer a severe form of anemia329 
and require weekly blood transfusions for the remainder of their 
lives.330 According to one expert, “[i]t took four years of extensive in-
vestigations involving more than 100 experts from clinical, pre-
clinical, manufacturing, process sciences, logistics, quality, analyti-
cal, and regulatory fields and in excess of one hundred million dol-
lars” to determine that the uncoated rubber stoppers of the vials con-
taining Eprex®, when exposed to the new stabilizer, released sub-
stances into the Eprex® solution that most likely caused the increase 
in the product’s immunogenicity and led to the increased occurrence 
of pure red cell aplasia.331 In light of situations such as this, BIO ad-
vocates clinical studies in the form of “process-specific immunogenic-
ity and safety testing” for each new protein product, warning that 
“anything less could be detrimental to patient health.”332  
 An additional concern of the branded pharmaceutical industry 
with respect to immunogenicity that arises from Senate Bill 623 is 
the bill’s language providing that “the Secretary shall issue a compa-
rable biological product license for all conditions of use of the refer-
ence product sharing the same mechanism or mechanisms of action 
for which the applicant has demonstrated comparability for a single 
condition of use.”333 According to Dr. Siegel of Johnson & Johnson, 
this provision presumes that “if the drug has the same mechanism in 
two conditions, evidence of safety in one condition can be used to es-
tablish comparable safety in the other.”334 Dr. Siegel charges that this 
presumption “is not scientifically correct” because some biologics are 
“immunogenic when used in some diseases and not in others.”335 Cit-
ing examples of such immunogenic events, Dr. Siegel questions “the 
wisdom of approval for all indications with the same mechanism of 
action after demonstration of comparability in just one indication.”336 
He maintains that it risks patient safety to study a particular bio-
logic product’s immunogenicity in patients less susceptible to an ad-
                                                                                                                     
 327. Hearings on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 276, at 13 (testimony of Dr. David 
Schenkein).  
 328. Id.  
 329. Kobylarz, supra note 201. 
 330. Hearing on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 276, at 14 (testimony of Dr. David 
Schenkein). 
 331. Id. at 13-14; Kobylarz, supra note 201.  
 332. Dec. 13, 2004 BIO Letter to FDA, supra note 249, at 35. 
 333. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(4)(A) (2007). 
 334. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 9 (testimony of Dr. Jay P. 
Siegel). 
 335. Id.  
 336. Id.  
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verse immune response and then apply this information to a patient 
population prone to a heightened adverse immune response.337 
 For the reasons described above, the branded pharmaceutical in-
dustry suggests that immunogenicity should be monitored through 
pre-market clinical trials as well as post-market surveillance.338 The 
industry insists that, for reasons of patient safety, the latter cannot 
substitute for the former.339 
 The branded industry criticizes Senate Bill 623 with respect to its 
provisions relating to post-marketing safety surveillance and post-
marketing clinical studies. First, as noted by Dr. Siegel, the legisla-
tion is “silent on the matter of post-marketing safety surveillance.”340 
Moreover, Senate Bill 623 limits the FDA’s ability to require post-
market clinical studies from a follow-on manufacturer.341 Dr. Siegel 
asserts that post-marketing surveillance and clinical studies are im-
perative in order to address safety concerns such as immunogenicity 
profile or unexpected toxicities that may arise only after marketing 
the product.342 In his view, in the absence of such studies, careful 
regulators might feel obliged to require even more pre-marketing 
testing, which would simultaneously undermine the purpose of the 
abbreviated approval pathway and fail to protect patient safety none-
theless.343 
 The FDA seems to have identified immunogenicity as the most se-
rious obstacle to follow-on biologics. Dr. Janet Woodcock, Deputy 
Commissioner of the FDA, states that “some degree of clinical as-
sessment of a new product’s immunogenic potential will ordinarily be 
needed.”344 The FDA’s Dr. Shacter has similarly expressed the view 
that because immunogenicity is nearly impossible to predict, clinical 
                                                                                                                     
 337. See id. at 6-10.  
 338. PhRMA Letter to FDA, supra note 323, at 2. 
 339. Id. at 12.  
 340. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 16 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel). 
 341. See Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(5) (2007) 
(providing that, upon agreement of the Secretary and the follow-on manufacturer seeking 
abbreviated approval, the follow-on manufacturer shall conduct one or more postmarketing 
safety studies “upon a reasonable showing that such study or studies would provide rele-
vant information not available from the studies on the reference product,” but precluding 
the Secretary from conditioning approval on any additional postmarketing studies). 
 342. See Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 22, at 16-17 (testimony of Dr. Jay 
P. Siegel) (stating that follow-on biologics raise safety concerns that “will require studies 
beyond the scope that pre-marketing studies can reasonably address” and that “[s]ome 
safety concerns can be identified only after broad, large-scale or prolonged exposure such 
as can best be studied in the post-marketing period”). 
 343. Id. at 17. 
 344. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 6, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Janet Woodcock) 
(stating that “[t]he extent of independent testing [of immunogenicity] needed will . . . de-
pend on a variety of scientific factors such as the indication, . . . the overall assessment of 
the product’s immunogenic potential, and whether there is the possibility of generating a 
cross-reaction with an important endogenous molecule”).  
608  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:555 
 
studies are therefore “necessary to rule out adverse immuno-
genic events.”345  
 When analyzing the various scientific issues relating to an abbre-
viated approval pathway for biologics, including the difficulties of 
analytical characterization, changes in the manufacturing process, 
and immunogenicity, it is critical to recall that House Bill 1038 does 
not require the FDA to approve any abbreviated applications for fol-
low-on protein products.346 Rather, the Bill simply grants the agency 
the flexibility to do so under certain circumstances. If Congress were 
to enact this legislation, the FDA would retain the right to assess 
each follow-on product on a case-by-case basis depending upon its 
degree of complexity and tailor its requests for clinical studies ac-
cordingly. As explained by one scientist, “[a]doption of this compara-
bility approach to biogenerics is scientifically sound, and [the] FDA 
should use a case-by-case approach for determining the appropriate 
approval criteria for biogenerics—just as it said in a recent White 
Paper that it has been doing with brand biopharmaceuticals.”347 With 
respect to brand manufacturers, the current case-by-case approach 
employed by the FDA includes not only analytical testing, which con-
stitutes “the first tier for comparability determination,” but also 
pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic testing.348 In addition, as 
noted by one industry expert, when a brand firm changes the manu-
facturing process for a biologic product, the FDA currently has the 
discretion to request “data from clinical studies or decide that prod-
ucts are not comparable” and deny approval to the product made via 
the new process.349 The FDA would possess this same authority un-
der House Bill 1038.350   
 Indeed, if House Bill 1038 were enacted, the details of implemen-
tation would be left to the FDA, which would need to develop a proc-
ess for scientifically evaluating follow-on biologics.351 At the Seventh 
Annual Generic Drugs Summit, hosted by the Institute of Interna-
tional Research in 2006, Senator Waxman predicted that companies 
will advocate to the FDA in support of the tests they use to demon-
strate that their products are comparable to the reference product.352 
                                                                                                                     
 345. April 23rd E-mail from Dr. Emily Shacter, supra note 259.  
 346. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 347. Hearing on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 321, at 3 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
liam Schwieterman). 
 348. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 245, at 4 (testimony of Theresa L. Gerrard).  
 349. Id.  
 350. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 351. See Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1297 (stating that “we expect that the sci-
entific criteria for what constitutes a biosimilar product will be left to the discretion of 
the FDA”).  
 352. Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Create Biogenerics Approval Path, THE FOOD & 
DRUG LETTER, Oct. 13, 2006.  
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Commentators expect the FDA to develop different generic approval 
processes for different classes of drugs, likely beginning with the less 
complex products first, so that approval of more complex products 
does not delay the approval of the simpler ones.353 While Congress 
can delegate the details of the scientific issues surrounding follow-on 
biologics to the FDA, it is entirely within Congress’s province to fash-
ion itself an intellectual property scheme that preserves incentives 
for innovation. 
C.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Modeled on the Hatch-Waxman Act Must Preserve Incentives for 
Investment in Innovator Products 
 Any legislation providing an abbreviated approval pathway for fol-
low-on protein products must also preserve incentives for innovation. 
As noted by Professor Grabowski, intellectual property is especially 
important to biotech firms seeking to attract venture capital and cre-
ate “partnerships with larger firms.”354 Indeed, “[m]ost of these firms 
have few, if any, profitable products” and therefore rely heavily on 
their intellectual property portfolios.355 House Bill 1038 provides in-
tellectual property protection for biologics, including both patent pro-
tection as well as some measure of non-patent marketing exclusivity, 
including data exclusivity and generic exclusivity.356 House Bill 1038 
seems to provide adequately for prompt resolution of patent chal-
lenges,357 and it ameliorates some of the problems engendered by the 
HWA by banning authorized generics during the 180-day period of 
generic exclusivity.358 The bill would be strengthened, however, by 
the addition of a provision ensuring a significant period of data ex-
clusivity359 as well as the inclusion of a thirty-month stay of generic 
entry where a follow-on manufacturer challenges an innovator’s pat-
ent.360 
                                                                                                                     
 353. Id.  (citing comments of Representative Henry Waxman); see also Ansell, supra 
note 214 (“Unlike small-molecule copycats, for biogenerics, the nature and extent of the 
data needed will also depend very much on the product involved: Regulatory guidelines 
must be defined product by product.”). 
 354. See Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Henry 
G. Grabowski). 
 355. Id. 
 356. See supra notes 107 & 113 (discussing non-patenting marketing exclusivity). 
 357. See infra Part VI.C.1. 
 358. See infra Part VI.C.4.  
 359. See infra Part VI.C.2. 
 360. See infra Part VI.C.3. 
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1.   House Bill 1038 Establishes an Efficient System for Patent 
Dispute Resolution 
 The primary form of intellectual property protection available for 
biological products is patent protection.361 Biological products may re-
ceive patent protection in two different ways. First, although patent 
law does not permit patenting of a naturally occurring substance,362 
an inventor who isolates a biological entity from its natural source 
may obtain patent protection.363 For example, Amgen’s EPOGEN®, a 
genetically engineered form of erythropoietin that stimulates the 
production of red blood cells and is used to treat anemia, enjoys pat-
ent protection.364 Second, process patents are available for new proc-
esses used to manufacture known biologics; such patents would not 
cover the biological product itself.365 Patents run for twenty years 
from the date the patent application is filed.366 
 Two particular patent provisions of the HWA, the patent term 
restoration367 and the Bolar exception,368 already apply to biological 
products, without regard to whether such biologics achieved approval 
under the FDCA or the PHSA.369 Congress enacted the remaining in-
tellectual property provisions of the HWA, including those establish-
ing specialized dispute resolution procedures and marketing exclu-
                                                                                                                     
 361. A patent grant by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and an award 
of marketing approval by the FDA are separate events conditioned upon different criteria. 
FDA review determines whether a given product is sufficiently safe and effective to be 
marketed, while the USPTO grants patents for inventions that satisfy the statutory crite-
ria of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 107, at 19; see 
also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000) (setting forth the patent law criteria). Marketing a drug 
requires a firm both to obtain FDA approval and to consider whether such marketing 
would infringe any patents on the drug. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 107, at 19. 
 362. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“Excluded from such patent protec-
tion are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”). 
 363. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding 
that even though DNA sequences exist naturally in the human chromosome, they consti-
tute patentable subject matter if they are “purified and isolated” from the original organ-
ism in nature). 
 364. See U.S. Patent No. 5,955,422 (filed Aug. 2, 1993) (claiming in part “[a] pharma-
ceutical composition comprising a therapeutically effective amount of human erythropoi-
etin and a pharmaceutically acceptable diluent, adjuvant or carrier, wherein said erythro-
poietin is purified from mammalian cells grown in culture”). 
 365. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 100, at 13. 
 366. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). Commentators have noted, however, that “effective 
patent life for pharmaceuticals—the time remaining following FDA approval—is approxi-
mately eleven to twelve years in practice,” which is substantially shorter than the 18.5 
year average in other industries. Kuhlik, supra note 104, at 96-97. 
 367. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 369. See SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 100, at 14 (citation omitted) (explaining that 
the patent term restoration and “safe harbor” provisions in Title II of the HWA “were en-
acted as general amendments to the Patent Act;” that the patent term restoration provi-
sion expressly includes “ ‘human biological product[s]’ ” approved under the PHSA; and 
that “[t]he ‘safe harbor’ provision . . . has been construed to apply to biologics as well”). 
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sivity, as specific amendments to the FDCA rather than as amend-
ments to the patent code. Thus, these provisions apply only to those 
biologics approved under the FDCA, not to those governed by 
the PHSA.370  
 House Bill 1038 proposes to amend the PHSA so as to create spe-
cial patent dispute resolution proceedings for biologics analogous to 
those available to generic drug manufacturers under the HWA. The 
proposed legislation provides that if an applicant of a comparable bio-
logic elects to ask the patent holder of the reference product for a list 
of all patents related to the product, the patent holder must disclose 
this information within sixty days.371 The reference product patent 
holder is also obliged to update the list within thirty days from ob-
taining a new patent.372 Brand-name firms can demand payment of 
up to $1000 for the patent list.373  
 A follow-on applicant can then challenge any patent by furnishing 
the patent holder with the basis for the challenge.374 The patent 
holder wishing to bring an infringement action must commence it 
within forty-five days of notice of a challenge or else forfeit the oppor-
tunity to seek any remedy other than a reasonable royalty.375  
 Dr. Grabowski notes that, while legislators might view legislation 
such as House Bill 1038, which encourages patent challenges as a 
“good short-term mechanism for exposing more biologics to follow-on 
price competition,” pharmaceutical firms take a long view when mak-
                                                                                                                     
 370. See id. 
 371. Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(k)(17)(A)(i) (2007). 
 372. Id. These provisions were included in order to provide follow-on manufacturers of 
biologics with information about patents held by innovator firms analogous to the informa-
tion available to manufacturers of generic drugs. Generic drug manufacturers can access 
such patent information in the Orange Book, see supra note 64 and accompanying text, be-
cause the HWA requires each holder of an approved NDA to list in the Orange Book any 
product patents it believes would be infringed if a generic drug were marketed before the 
expiration of these patents. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 106, at 3. Commentators have 
noted that these listings “offer generic firms easy access to information required for filing 
an [ANDA],” and that, absent this listing, “generic manufacturers would be forced to inde-
pendently generate the data at considerable expense in terms of time and money.” Id. 
at 10.  
 Manufacturers of biologics do not, however, publish their patent information in the Or-
ange Book. See Dinh, supra note 196, at 111 (stating that “a biologic approved under a BLA 
is not listed in the Orange Book”). House Bill 1038 therefore requires the patent holder of 
the reference product to furnish this information to the follow-on manufacturer. 
 373. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(17)(A)(ii).  
 374. H.R. 1038, §§ 3(k)(17)(B), 3(b) (Additional Amendments). Currently, manufactur-
ers of follow-on protein products must wait to be sued by a patent holder for patent in-
fringement before they can mount a legal challenge to a patent. Kobylarz, supra note 201.  
 375. H.R. 1038, § 3(k)(17)(C). Similarly, the HWA provides that an innovator firm has 
forty-five days in which to bring an action for patent infringement against a follow-on 
manufacturer. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000).  
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ing R&D decisions.376 Thus, he warns that “increased uncertainty and 
IP litigation in biotech . . . would have significant negative incentive 
effects on capital market decisions for developing private and public 
biotech firms with promising pipelines.”377 For this reason, Dr. 
Grabowski strongly supports data exclusivity378 for innovator firms 
and has criticized House Bill 1038 for the absence of such protection, 
a view shared by the brand industry as well.379  
 Moreover, the brand industry points out that patent protection is 
often of limited use with respect to biological products, thereby ren-
dering data exclusivity all the more essential. BIO has expressed 
concern that, under a statutory scheme permitting abbreviated ap-
proval of follow-on protein products, manufacturers of follow-on 
products will be able to secure abbreviated regulatory approval 
based, in part, on the innovator’s prior approval, while at the same 
time avoiding infringing patents that protect the innovator’s prod-
uct.380  
 According to BIO, this likelihood arises from two particular char-
acteristics of biologic products. First, in light of the fact that biologics 
are highly variable molecules, a manufacturer of follow-on products 
will be required only to demonstrate that the product is “similar” or 
“highly similar” to the corresponding innovator product, not that it is 
identical.381 As a result, a follow-on biologic might be sufficiently 
similar to the innovator biologic to rely on the FDA’s finding of safety 
and effectiveness for the innovator product, but at the same time 
prove different enough from the innovator product to avoid a patent 
infringement claim. The follow-on product could thus achieve market 
entry before the innovator’s patent expires, which discourages in-
vestment in innovation.382 Second, because of characteristics specific 
to biologic products, which are “large molecules produced by living 
cells and organisms[,] patent protection is often narrower and easier 
to ‘design around’ than . . . [for] small molecule drugs.”383 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                     
 376. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 11 (testimony of Dr. Henry 
G. Grabowski). 
 377. Id. 
 378. See generally supra note 108 and accompanying text (defining data exclusivity). 
 379. See infra Part VI.C.2 for a discussion of House Bill 1038’s lack of data exclusivity 
for biologics. 
 380. See infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text. 
 381. See BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME WITHOUT 
STRONG DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 1  [herein-
after BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY], available at http://www.europa.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/FOBMarket 
Exclusivity_050307.pdf. 
 382. Id. at 2. 
 383. Id. at 1. BIO explains that the trend in patent law has been toward narrower pat-
ent claims. See id. at 3; see also Bruce S. Manheim, Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensur-
ing Continued Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 394, 399-400 
(2006) (explaining the reasons for the general trend in patent law toward the issuance of 
narrower patents for all products). What is more, biologic products in particular are sus-
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issue of data exclusivity is one of the most contested aspects of House 
Bill 1038.  
2.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Should Furnish a Significant Period of Data Exclusivity for 
Innovator Firms 
 The HWA includes a data exclusivity provision that prevents the 
FDA from approving any ANDA for five years from the date on which 
the FDA approved the corresponding new chemical entity.384 This 
provision, which furnishes a market incentive to engage in innova-
tion by providing a limited monopoly period to the pioneer, “applies 
even if there is no patent on the [innovator] drug.”385 In contrast, 
House Bill 1038 does not presently contain any provisions for data 
exclusivity for biological innovators.386 Thus, if this legislation were 
enacted, manufacturers of innovative protein products would face fol-
low-on entry as soon as a new biological entity receives FDA ap-
proval.387  
 BIO emphasizes that a substantial period of data exclusivity is 
particularly important in order to preserve incentives to research, 
develop, and manufacture new biologic products.388 BIO also claims 
                                                                                                                     
ceptible to narrow construction of their patents for three reasons. BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY, 
supra note 381, at 2-3. First, because of patent law limitations on patenting naturally oc-
curring substances, many biologics qualify only for process patent protection, which is eas-
ier to “ ‘design around’ ” than product patent protection. Id. Second, the patent law specific 
to biotechnology requires that patent claims be rather “narrowly drawn” (for example, to 
the particular protein), whereas patents on small molecule drugs often claim a whole class 
of related molecular structures. Id. at 3. Third, the large size of biologic products renders it 
possible to alter the product slightly so that it would still qualify as a follow-on product but 
yet prove “different enough to be outside the scope of the patents on the original prod-
uct.” Id.  
 384. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2007); see also supra 
note 108 and accompanying text (discussing data exclusivity); BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY, su-
pra note 381, at 1 n.1 (defining data exclusivity as “the time period after approval of the 
innovator’s product during which the FDA may not approve a follow-on biologic product re-
lying to any degree on the safety and effectiveness of the innovator product”). As noted by 
one commentator, “[a] competitor willing to develop its own full package of safety and ef-
fectiveness data need not wait for the exclusivity period to expire before challenging a pat-
ent.” Kuhlik, supra note 104, at 99 n.30. In light of the time and expense necessary to con-
duct clinical trials relating to safety and effectiveness, however, the ability to rely on the 
innovator’s data is particularly attractive to generic manufacturers.  
 385. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 107, at 34.   
 386. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Henry G. 
Grabowski) (stating that that House Bill 1038 lacks any data exclusivity provision); Letter 
from James C. Greenwood, President and CEO, Biotechnology Ind. Org., to Rep. Henry A. 
Waxman and Rep. Thomas M. Davis, III, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Mar. 26, 2007), available at  
http://bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/20070326Waxman-Davis.pdf. 
 387. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Henry 
G. Grabowski). 
 388. BIO Principles, supra note 232, at 2-3 (stating that, because patent protection is 
of limited use with respect to biological products, “non-patent exclusivity is necessary to 
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that the particular characteristics of follow-on protein products ren-
der it more difficult for innovator biologic products, as compared to 
innovator small molecule drugs, to qualify for data exclusivity even if 
it is available.389 As noted above, an innovator product qualifies for 
data exclusivity only against a generic product that contains “the 
same active moiety,” or active ingredient, as the reference product.390 
“To determine whether a follow-on product contains the same active 
moiety as the innovator product, [the] FDA analyzes such character-
istics as the molecule’s amino acid sequence and covalently bonded 
structure.”391 As noted above, however, it is not always possible to 
characterize a biologic product,392 particularly the more complex ones, 
and, as a result, it might not be possible for the FDA to determine 
whether a follow-on product contains a previously approved active 
moiety.393 BIO warns that a follow-on manufacturer might provide 
the FDA enough information about its active moiety to earn the right 
to rely upon the innovator’s safety and effectiveness data in confer-
ring an expedited approval on the follow-on product pursuant to the 
proposed House Bill 1038, but still not enough information for the 
innovator to take advantage of the five-year exclusivity.394 BIO ex-
plains that this precise circumstance arose with two biologic products 
which, as members of the class of hyaluronidase products,395 are 
regulated as drugs and therefore subject to the HWA.396 As noted by 
BIO, because the “FDA considered each product to be a member of 
the same general class of hyaluronidase products, which allowed the 
products to rely on [the] FDA’s previous safety and effectiveness de-
terminations regarding hyaluronidase.”397 Nevertheless, “for exclusiv-
ity purposes, [the] FDA treated each product as a new chemical en-
tity. As such, each product received its own exclusivity and was not 
blocked by the other product.”398 
                                                                                                                     
maintain effective market protection” and that “the fledgling nature of the biologics indus-
try, its heavy dependence on access to significant amounts of high-cost public and private 
investment capital, and the high risks and costs involved in the development of new bio-
logic medicines all warrant a substantial period of exclusivity”). 
 389. Id.  
 390. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2007); see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 391. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 18. 
 392. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 393. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS , supra note 21, at 18-19 (citing the example of 
hyaluronidase, a biologic traditionally regulated by the FDA as a drug product). 
 394. See id. at 22 (“[T]he follow-on may provide enough information about its active 
moiety to rely on the innovator’s data, but not enough to be blocked by the innovator’s ex-
clusivity.”).  
 395. The hyaluronidases are enzymes used, among other things, “to increase the ab-
sorption and dispersion of other injected drugs.” Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 6, at 
14 (testimony of Dr. Janet Woodcock).  
 396. THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 19. 
 397. Id. at 22. 
 398. Id. 
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 BIO contends that any such system that allows a follow-on manu-
facturer to rely on the innovator’s data, but does not furnish concomi-
tant data exclusivity, “disrupt[s] the balance achieved by the [HWA]” 
in terms of facilitating generic competition while simultaneously pro-
tecting the pioneer’s investment.399 BIO advocates that innovators 
should enjoy the benefit of data exclusivity provisions for “any follow-
on product that relies to any degree on the clinical data provided to 
the FDA in support of approval of the pioneer biologic.”400  
 In terms of the optimal length of such data exclusivity, Professor 
Grabowski maintains that even the five-year period of data exclusiv-
ity furnished by the HWA is inadequate, and advocates for the inclu-
sion in House Bill 1038 of a ten-year data exclusivity period modeled 
on that of the European Union.401 According to Professor Grabowski, 
“R&D costs have increased substantially since Hatch-Waxman was 
enacted over 20 years ago,” and, consequently, “[b]reakeven returns 
on R&D for the average new drug products typically take more than 
a decade.”402 He also notes that a significant data exclusivity period 
encourages investment in new indications for approved biologics, 
which has resulted in important advances in treating many serious 
diseases, including cancer.403 Without such protection, “innovat[or] 
firms will have much less economic incentive to invest in the costly 
and risky process to gain approval for these new indications.”404 
 BIO advocates for an even longer period of data exclusivity for bio-
logics, suggesting a minimum of fourteen years “if biologics are to re-
ceive the same length of effective market protection as drugs, and 
thus avoid skewing investment away from higher risk biologics re-
search and development.”405 BIO arrived at this figure by referencing 
the HWA, which allows for the extension of patent on innovator 
                                                                                                                     
 399. Id. at 28. 
 400. Id. at 21. 
 401. See Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Henry G. 
Grabowski) (“A ten year exclusivity period, like that currently exists in Europe, would help 
balance innovation incentives and price competition when instituting a new regulatory 
pathway for biologicals.”). 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. See infra note 405 regarding the importance of new indications for existing 
pharmaceutical products. 
 404. Hearing on Biotech Drugs, supra note 108, at 12-13 (testimony of Dr. Henry 
G. Grabowski). 
 405. BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY, supra note 381, at 1. BIO also advocates an additional 
period of exclusivity, not less than two years beyond the fourteen-year period, for new indi-
cations for already approved products, in light of the importance of new indications for se-
rious conditions such as cancer. Id. at 4 (“Data exclusivity for new indications is critical in 
areas such as cancer research, where initial marketing approval generally focuses on late-
stage disease, and research and development activities for early-stage or adjuvant thera-
pies most often occur much later in time.”).  
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products for up to fourteen years following product approval.406 As 
further support for its view, BIO emphasizes that the biotechnology 
industry is made up of small start-up companies that are particularly 
vulnerable to changes in investment incentives.407 
 BIO emphasizes that a fourteen-year period of data exclusivity 
would run concurrently with the patent term for the product, which 
itself may run for at least fourteen years, and thus would not actu-
ally extend the effective period of market exclusivity.408 Instead, in 
cases where patent protection proved insufficient because a follow-on 
manufacturer was able to work around the innovator’s patents but 
still gain approval for the follow-on product, a fourteen-year period of 
data exclusivity would furnish some measure of effective protec-
tion.409 As explained by BIO, “a 14-year period of data exclusivity 
serves essentially as an insurance policy that provides the innovator 
with some certainty of protection, given that a FOB [follow-on bio-
logic] can be approved on the basis of a less stringent standard 
of similarity.”410  
 In light of the importance of intellectual property in the biologics 
industry and the European example which provides ten years of data 
protection, it is clear that an abbreviated approval pathway for fol-
low-on biologics ought to provide some period of data exclusivity. In 
the United States, “the effective patent life for pharmaceuticals—the 
time remaining following FDA approval—is approximately eleven to 
twelve years.”411 Thus, a data protection period of ten to twelve years, 
which would run concurrently with the patent term for the product, 
would provide pioneer firms with the assurance that they would earn 
a reasonable monopoly period in return for the time, money, and ef-
fort they expended in developing an innovator biologic product. 
                                                                                                                     
 406. Id. at 3-4 (“Given that Congress has previously concluded that 14 years of patent 
protection is appropriate for drugs and biological products, any statutory formula that al-
lows for FOBs should at least guarantee that same degree of effective market protec-
tion . . . .”); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing the provision in the 
HWA providing for up to fourteen years of market exclusivity in total). 
 407. See BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY, supra note 381, at 1-2, 6-8 (noting that most biotech-
nology companies are small start-ups that have not yet turned a profit and therefore are 
highly reliant upon venture capital). Relative to the traditional pharmaceutical industry, 
the biotech industry faces high costs of capital and production and significant manufactur-
ing uncertainties. See id. at 5-6 (describing the challenges facing manufacturers of biolog-
ics); see also supra notes 354-55 (regarding the importance of the preservation of invest-
ment incentives as particularly important in the biopharmaceutical industry). 
 408. BIO DATA EXCLUSIVITY, supra note 381, at 4.  
 409. Id. 
 410. Id.  
 411. Kuhlik, supra note 104, at 96-97.   
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3.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Should Provide a Thirty-Month Stay for the Innovator Firm While 
Infringement Litigation Is Pending 
 Another way in which House Bill 1038 differs from the HWA is 
that the proposed legislation does not offer innovator firms a thirty-
month stay or any other delay in approval based on an infringement 
action brought by an innovator firm.412 As noted above,413 the HWA 
provides that during a patent holder’s infringement action against a 
generic manufacturer,414 the FDA must suspend final approval of the 
generic manufacturer’s ANDA for thirty months from the date the 
patent owner received notice of the challenge to its patent.415 The 
thirty-month stay aims to foster the resolution of the patent in-
fringement litigation before the marketing of a generic product, 
thereby avoiding a loss of profits by the innovator.416 The HWA also 
provides that the patent holder may bring an action for damages if, 
after the thirty-month stay ends, the patent in question is found 
valid and infringed.417  
 Concerned about innovator firms’ use of multiple thirty-month 
stays to achieve de facto patent extensions,418 in 2003, Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 412. Arnold & Porter, supra note 174, at 4.  
 413. See supra note 111 and accompanying text regarding the functioning of the thirty-
month stay pursuant to the HWA. 
 414. See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.  
 415. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). 
 416. Day, supra note 114, at 229. When it enacted the HWA, Congress did recognize 
that the thirty-month stay might expire before the disposition of the infringement lawsuit. 
Catherine E. Creely, Comment, Prognosis Negative: Why the Language of the Hatch-
Waxman Act Spells Trouble for Reverse Payment Agreements, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 155, 184 
(2006). In this circumstance, the FDA can approve the generic product for marketing. Id. 
at 166 (“If the thirty-month period expires without an unappealable resolution to the pat-
ent infringement suit, the FDA may approve the generic product for marketing.”). At the 
time Congress enacted the HWA, however, thirty months was the approximate time re-
quired for FDA review and approval of generic applicants’ ANDAs, as well as roughly the 
amount of time required for judicial resolution of the infringement lawsuit. FTC STUDY, 
supra note 85, at iii.  
 417. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000). The patent owner’s remedies for infringe-
ment under the HWA include recovery of lost profits and, possibly, “treble damages if the 
infringement was willful.” SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 106, at 6. The patent owner 
may also have the infringing product removed from the market. Id. Commentators have 
noted that these remedies might be difficult to enforce, however, because in practice it is 
hard to achieve removal of the infringing product from store shelves and “individual medi-
cine cabinets.” Id. What is more, it may be impossible for a generic firm, given their often 
small capitalization, to compensate the plaintiff for significant financial harm, especially 
where blockbuster drugs are concerned. Id. It should be noted that, as a protection for ge-
neric firms under the HWA, the patent holder is required to post a bond covering its com-
petitor’s market losses should the patent be found invalid or not infringed. Id.  
 418. See FTC STUDY, supra note 85, at iv-v (describing this problem and stating that 
“[t]he history thus far of multiple 30-month stays caused by the filing of later-issued pat-
ents appears problematic”); Anne-Marie C. Yvon, Note, Settlements Between Brand and 
Generic Pharmaceutical Companies: A Reasonable Antritrust Analysis of Reverse Pay-
ments, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1883, 1895 (2006) (explaining that some brand companies de-
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amended the original HWA, and the FDA promulgated a rule in or-
der to limit brand name companies to only one thirty-month stay per 
ANDA application.419 Innovator firms could request a stay only with 
respect to those patents listed in the Orange Book at the time of a fol-
low-on firm’s challenge.420 One commentator, speaking at the time of 
this amendment, noted that a single thirty-month stay “would not be 
likely to cause a significant delay in the generic’s introduction to the 
marketplace, because the stay would run concurrent to the FDA’s 
consideration of the application, which usually takes 18-25 months” 
for generic small molecule drugs.421  
 BIO strongly critiques the absence of a thirty-month stay provi-
sion in House Bill 1038, advocating that “[a]ny follow-on biologics 
regulatory pathway should ensure that any patent challenge involv-
ing the follow-on biologic product will be litigated prior to marketing 
approval of the follow-on product, in order to protect the innovator’s 
intellectual property rights and avoid confusion in the medical, pa-
tient, and payer communities.”422 If a generic product is launched be-
fore the resolution of any patent challenges and then is later found to 
be infringing on the innovator’s patent, the ensuing loss of the inno-
vator’s profits is not the only harm to result. Because the offending 
product must be withdrawn from the market, there is the potential 
for confusion on the part of doctors and consumers, which may lead 
                                                                                                                     
veloped strategies for obtaining multiple thirty-month stays, thereby delaying generic drug 
entry for several years). 
 419. See Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 1101, 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-60 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2) 
and (5) (2000)); Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 
36677 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).  
 420. SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 106, at 10 (discussing changes to the Hatch-
Waxman Act in P.L. 108-173, limiting brand name companies to only one 30-month stay on 
those patents listed in the Orange Book at the time of a challenge to the innovator’s pat-
ent); see also Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 1101, 1102 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-60 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2) 
and (5) (2004)); Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug; 68 Fed. Reg. 36676, 
36677 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b) (2007) (setting 
forth the type of patent information that patent holders may include in their Orange 
Book listings). 
 421. Sarah E. Eurek, Note, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of 
Generic Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0018, ¶13, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2003DLTR0018.pdf; see also FDA, 
White Paper, New FDA Initiative on “Improving Access to Generic Drugs” (June 12, 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/generics/whitepaper.html (“On average, it takes more 
than 20 months for a new generic drug to be approved by the FDA.”). But see The Generic 
Drug Maze: Speeding Access to Affordable, Life Saving Drugs: Hearing Before the Special 
S. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (testimony of Gary Buehler, Dir. of the Office of 
Generic Drugs, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr161gb.pdf (stating that the median approval times for the 
FDA’s office of generic drugs “have decreased from 18.4 months in FY 2001 to 16.3 months 
in FY 2005”). 
 422. BIO Principles, supra note 232, at 3. 
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to adverse implications for human health.423 What is more, BIO as-
serts that “[a]ddressing patent issues as part of the approval process 
allows the FDA to prioritize its resources” by focusing first on those 
generic products that are not facing patent challenges and can, there-
fore, be brought to market more quickly.424  
 Congress should include in House Bill 1038 a provision allowing 
one thirty-month stay of FDA approval of a follow-on biologic pend-
ing resolution of infringement litigation, modeled on the HWA.425 In 
amending the HWA to resolve the problems engendered by multiple 
thirty-month stays, Congress nonetheless chose to retain a single 
thirty-month stay.426 This thirty-month period essentially runs con-
currently with the FDA approval process, somewhat less than thirty 
months.427 In light of the fact that approval of follow-on biologics 
takes the FDA an even longer time on average, roughly 34.7 months 
in 2003,428 the inclusion of a single thirty-month stay in legislation 
creating an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics 
would not appreciably delay the market entry of such products. The 
benefit offered by such a provision would be to allow for resolution of 
some patent challenge before launch of a follow-on product, thereby 
preserving incentives for innovation by pioneer firms. 
4.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Should Retain House Bill 1038’s Ban on Authorized Generics 
During 180-Day Period of Generic Exclusivity 
 House Bill 1038 proposes a ban on authorized generics during the 
180-day period of generic exclusivity enjoyed by brand firms.429 This 
provision reflects a debate currently surrounding the 180-day generic 
exclusivity period for traditional drugs regulated under the HWA.430 
                                                                                                                     
 423. See THE DIFFERENCE WITH BIOLOGICS, supra note 21, at 11, 23. 
 424. Id. at 23.  
 425. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 
42 U.S.C.).  
 426. Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 
1101, 1102, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-60 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2) and 
(5) (2000)).  
 427. See supra note 421 and accompanying text.  
 428. See Robert Rogoyski, Note, The Orphan Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity 
Incentive, 7 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 4 (2006), http://www.stlr.org/html/volume7/rogoyski.pdf.  
 429. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (discussing generic exclusivity un-
der the HWA); supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (discussing House Bill 1038’s 
proposed treatment of authorized generics). 
 430. In January 2007, Sen. John Rockefeller (D-WV) reintroduced a bill that would 
amend the HWA so as to preclude the marketing of authorized generic drugs during the 
180-day exclusivity period. See Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act, S. 438, 110th 
Cong. § 2 (2007). This bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, La-
bor, and Pensions. See The Library of Congress, Thomas, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d110:s.00438: (last visited June 23, 2008). In addition, in March 2006, the 
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Many commentators contend that a ban on authorized generic ver-
sions of traditional drugs will encourage generic firms to undertake a 
patent challenge, since the first generic firm to bring a successful 
patent challenge will earn a 180-day period of market exclusivity.431  
 As noted above, the FDA currently treats authorized generics as 
branded products for the purposes of product approval and therefore 
allows them to compete with generic products awarded 180-day ex-
clusivity.432 As a result, branded firms have taken advantage of this 
loophole, either by creating subsidiaries to market authorized gener-
ics or by licensing generic manufacturers to sell them.433 
 The generic pharmaceutical industry contends that permitting au-
thorized generics to take advantage of the 180-day generic exclusiv-
ity period “devalue[es]” the 180-day exclusivity that generic firms 
could otherwise enjoy, and thus dissuades generic firms from enter-
ing the market, resulting in higher drug prices for consumers.434 The 
generic pharmaceutical industry especially decries authorized gener-
ics in light of the fact that brand firms, in marketing their generics, 
are not required to submit to the rigorous abbreviated approval proc-
ess necessary for “true” generics.435 One industry analyst estimates 
that authorized generics cause generic firms to lose “potentially half 
of the windfall that comes from an exclusive generic launch, an 
amount that could easily reach a billion dollars” for certain block-
buster drugs.436 According to the generic industry, this circumstance 
decreases the incentives for generic manufacturers to challenge pat-
ents. If generic firms stop challenging patents, this would “remove 
the incentive that caused brand-name companies to create author-
ized generics in the first place.”437 Ultimately, consumers would suf-
fer from the lack of low-cost alternatives to branded products.438 
 In response, the branded industry cites two recent studies in sup-
port of its contention that the entry of authorized generics during the 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. Federal Trade Commission announced its intention to study the short- and long-term 
competitive effects of authorized generics and to publish its finding in 2007. Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Proposes Study of Competitive Impacts of Authorized Generic 
Drugs (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/03/authgenerics.shtm. Re-
search did not reveal any such publication as of May 2008. 
 431. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
 432. See supra note 193. 
 433. Knock It Off, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2007, at 77.  
 434. See AGING & ELDER HEALTH WEEK, supra note 191, at 429. 
 435. See LAB BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 191, at 799. 
 436. Knock It Off, supra note 433, at 77.  
 437. Olga Pierce, Analysis: Authorized Generic Bad Medicine?, UNITED PRESS INT’L, 
July 31, 2006, http://www.upi.com/HealthBusiness/view.php?StoryID=20060731-051519-9696r (quoting Aidan 
Hollis, Academic Dir. of the Ctr. for Regulatory Affairs at the Van Horne Institute, Canada 
and author of the study referenced infra notes 441-43). 
 438. See id. (citing Hollis’s concerns about “indefinitely high drug prices” in the ab-
sence of competition by generic firms). 
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180-day period of generic exclusivity does not harm consumers. The 
first study, published by IMS Health in 2006 and funded by PhRMA, 
claims that the entry of an authorized generics competitor actually 
leads to greater generic price discounts relative to the branded drug’s 
price, both during and after the 180-day exclusivity period.439 The 
second study, conducted by a team consisting of an academic and 
consultants and also funded by PhRMA, concludes that increased au-
thorized generic entry has not delayed the entry of generic competi-
tors and has in fact benefited consumers through lower 
drug prices.440  
 In contrast, another study, funded by the GPhA and conducted by 
two academics, reviewed the IMS study and revealed several flaws in 
terms of its methodology and analysis.441 In particular, this critique 
of the IMS study notes that brand firms inflate drug prices in mar-
kets with authorized generics in order to differentiate their products, 
thereby falsely increasing the apparent discount generated by au-
thorized generics.442 Ultimately, the study’s authors conclude that 
authorized generics “undermine the generic exclusivity period that 
Congress created to encourage the generic companies to challenge 
the patents that block competition” and “in the process, negatively 
impact consumers.”443  
 Certainly, it undermines the purpose of the 180-day generic exclu-
sivity period to allow authorized generics to compete with “genuine” 
generics, thereby upsetting the carefully crafted balance of the HWA. 
This effect is magnified by the fact, documented in several sources, 
that authorized generics do not offer genuine savings to consumers 
because brand firms inflate the prices of branded products in mar-
kets where they offer authorized generics.444 Consequently, House 
Bill 1038 should maintain its ban on authorized generics. 
                                                                                                                     
 439. IMS CONSULTING, ASSESSMENT OF AUTHORIZED GENERICS IN THE U.S. 1-2 (2006), 
available at http://www.phrma.org/files/IMS%20Authorized%20Generics%20Report_6-22-06.pdf. 
 440. Ernst R. Berndt et al., Do Authorized Generic Drugs Deter Paragraph IV Certifica-
tions? Recent Evidence 13 (April 7, 2007) (PhRMA Working Paper), available at 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/analysisgroup/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/PhRMA_Authorized_Generic_Entry.pdf. 
 441. Aidan Hollis & Bryan A. Liang, An Assessment of the Effect of Authorized Generics 
on Consumer Prices 5-8 (July 31, 2006), available at  
http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Issues&Template=/CM/ContentDisp
lay.cfm&ContentID=2647. 
 442. See Hollis & Liang, supra note 441, at 16-18 (noting the trend toward higher 
brand prices in markets with authorized generics); SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 107, at 
33 (“Brand name firms have reacted to the opportunities for establishing a generic market 
provided in the 1984 Act by ‘maintaining and even raising the price of the brand-name 
product on the theory that the demand for it was more inelastic than the demand for the 
price-sensitive segment; they have embarked on a new aggressive strategy designed to 
serve the brand-loyal segment and capture a substantial share of the generic market.’ ”(ci-
tation omitted)). 
 443. Hollis & Liang, supra note 441, at 1. 
 444. See supra note 442. 
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5.   An Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics 
Would Promote Innovation by Stimulating Further Improvements 
to Existing Biologics 
 In crafting an abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biolog-
ics, it is crucial to preserve incentives for innovation by pioneer 
firms. It is also important, however, to consider how implementation 
of an abbreviated approval framework will itself stimulate competi-
tion. According to industry expert Dr. Scott Gottlieb, a resident fel-
low at the American Enterprise Institute and the former Director of 
Medical Policy Development and Deputy Commissioner for Medical 
and Scientific Affairs at the FDA, one major benefit flowing from an 
abbreviated approval pathway that has been overlooked by most 
commentators is the likelihood that increased competition will stimu-
late further improvements to existing biologics.445 Dr. Gottlieb pre-
dicts that: 
[l]egislation to expose today’s biologics to easier competition, after 
legitimate patents have expired, is going to accelerate development 
of improved products, not just lower-cost, copycat versions of out-
dated proteins. Those making static assumptions against today’s 
standards of care about how much savings this legislation is likely 
to bring are losing sight of the competition and progress they will 
have unleashed.446 
 Dr. Gottlieb’s assertion that an abbreviated approval pathway for 
follow-on biologics will stimulate innovation undercuts the biotech 
industry’s concern that the FDA’s consideration of abbreviated appli-
cations for follow-on protein products will undermine the develop-
ment of new drugs and biologics. According to Dr. Schenkein of 
Genentech, follow-on biologics “raise novel and complex questions of 
science and law,” and FDA consideration of these issues threatens to 
drain agency resources from the important task of reviewing new 
drugs and biologics.447 This view overlooks, however, the potential for 
innovation that arises from an environment that fosters and sup-
ports the development of follow-on and second- and third-
generation biologics. 
                                                                                                                     
 445. Scott Gottlieb, Biologics Legislation Will Speed Progress, FORBES, Apr. 16, 2007, 
http://www.forbes.com/personalfinance/2007/04/16/biologics-genentec-amgen-pf-guru-in_sg_0416soapbox_inl.html (stat-
ing that “the most enduring effect of the legislation may be to accelerate the development 
of much-improved second- and third-generation versions of today’s medicines”). 
 446. Gottlieb, supra note 445; see also ENGEL & NOVITT, supra note 5, at 16 (“Increased 
competition for follow-on products to first-generation biologics would be anticipated to cre-
ate a pressure to reduce the cost of these products, thereby producing a positive cost dis-
parity between the first and subsequent generations of biologic products that does not 
presently occur, thereby potentially enabling increased savings as well as producing incen-
tives for further innovation.”). 
 447. Hearing on Biosimilar Policy, supra note 276, at 23 (testimony of Dr. 
David Schenkein). 
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 Keeping in mind these dual goals of lowering health care costs for 
consumers as well as stimulating the development of products that 
promote human health, the European Union recently became the 
first western market to implement an abbreviated approval pathway 
for follow-on biologics.448 The E.U. model can offer important guid-
ance to U.S. legislators and policy makers considering this issue. 
VII.   THE EUROPEAN UNION FRAMEWORK FOR ABBREVIATED 
APPROVAL OF BIOSIMILARS 
 In 2004, the E.U. adopted legislation establishing a regulatory 
framework for the evaluation, approval, and monitoring of follow-on 
protein products, which are referred to as similar biological medici-
nal products or biosimilars.449 As noted by one E.U. Commission450 of-
ficial testifying before a congressional committee considering House 
Bill 1038, which proposes a case-by-case approach to follow-on pro-
tein products, the E.U. has indeed embraced a case-by-case evalua-
tion of biosimilars.451 He explains that  
[t]he type and amount of pre-clinical and clinical data are not pre-
defined in legislation but are determined on a case by case basis, 
on the basis of the relevant scientific guidelines. This approach re-
flects the wide spectrum of molecular complexity among the vari-
ous products concerned, ranging from relatively simple molecules 
such as insulin to far more complex ones. Thus, the requirements 
to demonstrate safety and efficacy of a biosimilar are essentially 
product class-specific. In theory, a biosimilar application could 
therefore range from being almost ‘as abridged’ as a generic appli-
                                                                                                                     
 448. Katja Feick, Patent Expiries and the Prospect of Cost Savings to Underline the 
Popularity of Generics and Biogenerics in Europe, BUSINESS BRIEFING: PHARMAGENERICS 
2004, 16, 16 (2004). Commentators have noted that cost containment is particularly impor-
tant for European national health care systems. Id. at 998 (“Lower-priced biogenerics . . . 
hold great appeal for cash-strapped governments and are set to experience wider usage.”). 
Moreover, the concept of follow-on protein products is familiar in this region because fol-
low-on protein products are already produced in eastern Europe. See id. at 998 (“At pre-
sent, biogenerics are being produced without such regulatory constraints in east-
ern Europe.”). 
 449. Council Directive 2004/27, 2004 O.J. (L314) 34 (EC); Follow-On Biologics: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hearing on Follow-On Biologics] (statement of Nicolas Rossignol, Admin., 
European Comm’n Pharms. Unit), available at http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_08/Rossignol.pdf.  
 450. The European Commission’s role with respect to pharmaceuticals is threefold: to 
propose new legislation; to implement existing legislation; and to authorize for market en-
try and monitor certain types of medicines, including all biotech products created via re-
combinant DNA technology. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 449, at 1 (testi-
mony of Nicolas Rossignol). The Commission bases its decisions regarding market authori-
zation on scientific standards developed by the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). Id. at 
3; see also infra note 453 and accompanying text. 
 451. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 449, at 3 (testimony of Nicolas Ros-
signol).  
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cation (with very limited non-clinical/clinical studies), to being 
nearly as complete as a full, stand-alone application.452 
 E.U. legislators have charged the European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA)453 with developing scientific guidelines setting forth the re-
quired nonclinical and clinical data to be furnished by manufacturers 
submitting applications for approval of biosimilars.454 It should be 
noted that the EMEA does not require that a follow-on protein prod-
uct demonstrate bioequivalence; instead, it imposes a “comparability” 
standard.455 However, existing EMEA guidelines do not at this time 
address the issue of interchangeability.456  
 To date, the E.U. Commission has given market authorization to 
two biosimilars, both in April 2006.457 Both products, Sandoz’s Omni-
trope458 and Biopartners’ Valtropin, are growth hormones.459 Several 
other relatively simple biosimilars, including erythropoietins, inter-
ferons, insulins, and granulocyte-colony stimulating factors, are also 
the subject of applications presently in the EMEA pipelines.460 Be-
cause the E.U. regulatory framework is so new, it is quite difficult to 
assess the impact that the introduction of biosimilars will have on 
prices of biologics in Europe.461 In terms of safety and efficacy, the 
E.U. framework provides for post-market monitoring, which is re-
quired for all pharmaceutical products in that region.462 In moving 
forward on its biosimilar framework, the E.U. exerts pressure on the 
U.S. to do the same, both in order to lower health care costs and to 
                                                                                                                     
 452. Id.  
 453. The EMEA is an E.U. agency responsible for “protection and promotion of public 
and animal health, through the evaluation and supervision of medicines for human and 
veterinary use.” European Medicines Agency, About EMEA, 
http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (last visited June 23, 2008). 
 454. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 449, at 3 (testimony of Nicolas Ros-
signol).  
 455. Alston & Bird, supra note 11, at 4. 
 456. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 449, at 7 (testimony of Nicolas Ros-
signol).  
 457. Id. at 6; Grabowski et al., supra note 68, at 1297. 
 458. The E.U.’s approval of Omnitrope undoubtedly influenced the FDA’s decision to do 
the same the following month. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the U.S. FDA’s ap-
proval of Omnitrope. 
 459. Hearing on Follow-On Biologics, supra note 449, at 6 (testimony of Nicolas Ros-
signol). 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. It should be noted that E.U. authorities impose price controls on pharmaceuti-
cal products. Thus far, Omnitrope has been priced at twenty to thirty percent below the 
innovator product. Press Release, European Generic Meds. Ass’n., IAPO Paper Ignores the 
Science of Biosimilars (Dec. 5, 2006), http://www.egagenerics.com/pr-2006-12-05.htm. The 
European Generic Medicines Association estimates a two to three million euro reduction in 
health care costs annually resulting from the use of just five biosimilar medicines. Id.  
 462. European Generic Medicines Ass’n, FAQ on Biosimilars, 
http://www.egagenerics.com/FAQ-biosimilars.htm (last visited June 23, 2008) (“Guidance 
on risk management systems has also been developed which assures safe market entry and 
post-marketing monitoring of these medicines.”). 
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attract investment in research and development relating to follow-on 
protein products. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 In light of the high cost of biopharmaceuticals and their impor-
tance for human health, Congress is currently considering House Bill 
1038, a bill that proposes an abbreviated approval pathway for fol-
low-on biologics. Consideration of the legal and policy implications of 
an abbreviated approval pathway demonstrates that, in the main, 
enactment of House Bill 1038 will achieve the stated goals of the leg-
islation. First, legislative enactment of an abbreviated approval 
pathway for follow-on protein products will indeed, over time, stimu-
late a robust market in such products, analogous to the market for 
small molecule drugs effectuated by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Second, 
the FDA, the agency responsible for drug approval in the United 
States, indicates that the current state of scientific knowledge sup-
ports an abbreviated approval pathway, at least for simpler protein 
products. Moreover, House Bill 1038 allows for consideration of fol-
low-on protein products on a case-by-case basis, permitting the FDA 
to require the safety and efficacy data it needs in support of the ap-
proval process. Finally, with some small adjustments, House Bill 
1038 can preserve incentives for innovation by pioneer firms while 
simultaneously encouraging competition from follow-on firms. This 
Article proposes two adjustments to House Bill 1038, the inclusion of 
a substantial period of data exclusivity for innovators and a thirty-
month stay of approval for a follow-on product pending resolution of 
patent infringement litigation, in order to help this legislation attain 
in the realm of biologics the success that the Hatch-Waxman Act has 
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